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FRAUD AND IMPLICATIONS OF FRAUD

IN THE LAND GRANTS OF NEW MEXICO

VICTOR WESTPHALL".

IN

THE HISTORY of New

Mexico there has been more land claimed,
in one way or another, than there is land in the state. On its face,
this statement surely warrants a careful examination and analysis
of the extent and validity of the area claimed, a substantial amount
of which was in the large grants of land made by the governments
of Spain and Mexico.
George W. Julian came to think exactly this soon after he became surveyor general of New Mexico. "Julian, who had cast his
first presidential ballot for General Harrison in 1840, was seventy
years old when, on July 22, 1885, he assumed the duties of his
new office."l
His first attention was paid to the despoilers of the public domain. Evidence was everywhere at hand that this land was being
harvested by fraud at an unprecedented rate. "No early problem of
his administration worried [President] Cleveland so much as this
wholesale spoliation of the West."2 This worry was honestly shared
by Julian, who acted vigorously to save the public lands so they
could be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law. But he also
became interested in possible chicanery in land grant dealings
when he became aware of this problem soon after he entered upon
his official work. The result was an order from the General Land
Office instructing him to re-examine the cases acted upon by his
predecessors.
". The author would like to thank Michael ]. Rock for his interest and suggestions.
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In 1887 Julian presented a summary of the results of these reexaminations in a hypercritical article in the North American
Review entitled "Land Stealing in New Mexico." He declared
that
forged and fraudulent grants, covering very large tracts, were declared valid, and that the Surveyor-General's office very often became
a mere bureau in the service of grant claimants, and not the agent
and representative of the Government. Instead of construing these
grants strictly against the grantee, and devolving upon him the burden of establishing his claim by affirmative proofs, the Surveyor
General acted upon the principle that Spanish and Mexican grants
were to be presumed, and all doubts solved in the interest of the
claimant.s

Julian overlooked the important point that there was at least
some reason for the first surveyors general to act upon the principle that these grants were to be presumed. The United States
had just finished the Mexican War in which its motives were not
entirely pure; there was reason for contemporaries to be conscience stricken. Then too, native American generosity inclined
both public and officials to as liberal a view as the law allowed. The
instructions to the first surveyor general, William Pelham, made
it abundantly clear that property rights were to be fully protected.
Almost all of the 7,4°1,637 acres in the grants confirmed by Congress were so confirmed upon the recommendation of Pelham, who
was in office from 1854 to 1860, and his chief clerk, Alexander P.
Wilbar who succeeded Pelham and served for little more than a
year.
Pelham's duties in connection with Spanish and Mexican land
grants were of a minor but important character. Tasks dealing with
the public domain were his major work, and were outlined in
seven sections of his instructions. The last section authorized him
to "ascertain the origin, nature, character and extent of all claims
to lands under the laws, usages, and customs of Spain and Mexico'" originating before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848,
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and to report his opinion thereon for final action by the United
States Congress. Ironically, this supposedly minor duty could well
have consumed all of his time and energy. Records were often
fragmentary; furthermore, lands were abundant and cheap so
Spanish and Mexican governments had granted them in lavish
quantities.
.
It can be conjectured that had the claims approved by Pelham
and Wilbar been submitted at a later date to the Court of Private
Land Claims; I 89 I - 19°4, for final adjudication, rather than to
Congress, the area confirmed might well have been greatly diminished; nevertheless, it must be remembered that substantially
half a century had elapsed, with consequent changes in traditions
and attitudes. Moreover, the Court's findings were based on judicial practices while Congress was largely motivated by political
considerations, not the least of which was to get out of what was a
badly conceived plan from the beginning with at least some kind
of action.
The record of Pelham and Wilbar has stood the test of time
quite well; especially, they carried out their companion duties concerning the public domain with far less cause for censure than any
of their successors. Julian, however, did not spare them even
though they were fellow Democrats. He laid about him almost
universally with a heavy cudgel of indignant reproof. All of the
intervening surveyors general were Republicans; none were spared.
Julian selected for special consideration thirteen claims, totaling
3,073,812 acres, approved by a surveyor general but not confirmed
by Congress.1) Of these, one was never submitted to the Court of
Private Land Claims and five were entirely rejected. The seven
partially approved claims totaled only I 17,640 acres. This was less
than three per cent and certainly indicates that Julian was involved
in something more than a witch hunt. He also singled out three
claims, confirmed by Congress but not yet patented, totaling
664.449 acres. One of these was never submitted to the Court,
and one was approved for 1;085 acres. The third, the Las Vegas
Grant, was approved by a special ruling of the General Land Office
and was patented in 1903 for 431,653 acres.
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Looking at the matter from an even broader view than Julian's
findings, that is, comparing all of the grants approved by various
surveyors general with their eventual disposition by the Court of
Private Land Claims, calls for some startling observations. Six
surveyors general preceding Julian acted upon 136 claims, of
which 24 were patented by Congress, and only five rejected by a
surveyor general. Three of the five were later carried to the Court,
two of which were finally rejected and one approved. There were
7>3 1 3,450 acres in the 108 approved but unpatented claims; however, only 1,155>438 acres were approved by the Court. Of the
total, 30 were never submitted to the Court, 35 were entirely rejected, 40 were partially approved, and seven had their acreages increased by the Court. 6
It is apparent that Julian's observations concerning the enlargement of existing grants were valid, even considering the different
attitudes that might have governed the Court's rulings, had it
been sitting in judgment at an earlier date. Significantly, though,
in his introductory remarks Julian refers to forged and fraudulent
grants,7 yet when he comes to cases he cites almost entirely instances of grants with enlarged boundaries. The Court found an
abundance of enlarged grant boundaries, but very little actual
forgery of grant titles. We can only surmise that he saw about him
a great deal of obvious manipulation of the laws for the disposal
of the public domain and concluded that comparable deviousness
must surely also have been the case in connection with land grants.
Nevertheless, his larger consideration appears to have been the
public domain in which there was demonstrably fraud of many
kinds and degrees. Apparently he was convinced that, since this
was true, there must have been a close parallel in land grant matters, especially since the same persons were often involved in both
instances. He overlooked the complications in land grant speculation imposed by grantees and their heirs holding title to individual
land grants as tenants in common, a practice which made it impossible to give a marketable title without first acquiring title to the
entire grant. It was much easier to claim an excessive amount of
land in existing grants than to manufacture a grant out of whole
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cloth, and land grant speculators almost exclusively followed the
path of least resistance. 8
Julian's leading contemporary detractor was Stephen W. Dorsey
who wrote a rejoinder to Julian's charges, which also appeared in
the North American Review in 1887. Their dispute was essentially over possible fraud in land dealings, both land grants and the
public domain. Dorsey's rejoinder was slick and persuasive; he apparently proceeded on the premise that a good defense is a strong
attack. Dorsey harked back to earlier years in assaulting Julian's
personal integrity, but this had no real relevancy to the verbal
controversy. Despite these accusations, Julian must be accorded a
good grade for honest effort in New Mexico. "He was a politician
and a good Government man, and tried to comply with the details
of the law as he saw it. Above all, he could not be bought at any
price. It was undoubtedly this unimpeachable honesty that endeared him so little to his contemporaries in New Mexico."D
More to the point was Dorsey's statement that
mainly through Mr. Julian's exertions, nearly four hundred citizens
of New Mexico have been indicted on charges similar to those made
in the July number of the REVIEW. Yet up to this time, every man
tried has been acquitted. There is not a grain or a shadow of truth
that there have been or are now frauds 'committed to any extent in
New Mexico under the homestead and pre-emption laws. lO

Dorsey was demonstrably in error; his article appeared in 1887
and, through 189 I, there were 64 I criminal cases involving land
fraud tried in the district courts of New Mexico. There were only
fifteen cases with a jury verdict of guilty, but this does not tell the
entire story.
In 82 cases the defendant was not found by a United States Marshal,
and these marshals repeatedly wrote on subpoenas that after a
diligent search they were unable to find the defendants and did not
believe that person existed. This was probably true, because one
grant jury foreman pointed out that many entries were made with
fictitious names. Some of these defendants may have skipped the
country, but in either instance they were presumably guilty. Also,
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in 209 dismissed cases, all or part of the records were missing from
the transcript. Many dismissed cases were not prosecuted by the
U.S. Attorney because records were lost or stolen from the files. At
that time this was a serious difficulty, because all affidavits, etc., were
in longhand, and only single copies existed. Thus, if they were missing, it was difficult to duplicate them. Without the missing transcripts,
it is impossible to say how many of these cases were not prosecuted
because the records had already been stolen at the time of the
prosecution. The fact that the records were lost or stolen is a strong
presumption of guilt in all these cases. Then too, in 28 cases the
verdict is in neither the docket nor the transcript, and here also there
is a possibility of guilt. l l

It should be remembered that these cases were for violation of
laws governing disposal of the public domain. As Dorsey well
knew, in fact tacitly admitted,12 there were no cases tried involving
land grant dealings. There is a very persuasive reason why no
fraud cases involving grants were brought to the attention of the
courts. As the Court of Private Land Claims later declared, fraud
in land grants was limited primarily to enlarging grant boundaries.
Given the passage of time and the ambiguity of grant boundaries,
it would surely have been fruitless to prosecute for this cause;
furthermore, fraud connected with the public domain did not
necessarily imply comparable malfeasance related to grant titles.
The fact is that the public domain involved a neat parcel easily
acquired, which often controlled water. This was the valuable land
and much sought after. On the other hand land grants were held
almost entirely by tenants in common, and it was extremely difficult and time consuming to acquire all interests; consequently,
dealing in grants was largely speculative against the day when all
interests might be acquired. Smaller parcels of public domain
could readily be used as the nucleus controlling water for a cattle
ranching enterprise.
Dorsey was well acquainted with this procedure. He was a member
of half a dozen cattle corporations in Colfax County, lands of which
were carefully selected with the view of encompassing water which
would control land for miles around. He claimed the Una de Gato
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Grant of about 600,000 acres in Colfax County; and when its
forgery was demonstrated in 1879, he thought it unsafe to rely on
the spurious title and sought instead to secure the land by means of
homesteading and pre-emptions. He was unable to do this legally,
since the land was claimed as a grant and was, therefore, reserved
from settlement. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of the General
Land Office ordered the land surveyed and opened to settlers. This
was a convenience to Dorsey, who promptly arranged for conveyance
of land titles to his own ownership in wholesale lots by fictitious.
persons or those under his influence or in his employ.l3

In one instance he owned all the springs on 160· acres and this
controlled "the whole 10,000 acres back of it."14 "One contemporary source says that in I 88 I Dorsey had the largest individual
range in the Territory-about forty miles square just east of the
Maxwell Grant."1li This is hardly in keeping with his statement
that he was among the smaller landowners in New Mexico. Also
suspect is his assertion that he paid more money than the same
number of acres would cost inJowa. 16
Dorsey attempted to conceal his true relations with the Una de
Gato Grant by maintaining that it was he who discovered its
frauduleney and then applied to the Secretary of the Interior to
have it thrown open for settlement. 17 What Dorsey neglected to
mention was that the Honorable Secretary was so touched by hIS
misfortune that he violated the law in complying with Dorsey's
request. 1S The grant was approved by Surveyor General James
K. Proudfit in 1874 less than two months after it was filed. Even
though its forgery was demonstrated, it remained legally reserved
from settlement unless acted upon by Congress. It was never submitted to the Court of Private Land Claims; this neglect finally
extinguished the claim because that Court had legal authority
for final settlement of all claims. 19
To Dorsey's credit he did "demonstrate clear, sound, thinking
when dealing with the future with reference to rainfall, irrigation
works, the livestock industry, and the uses generally to which, in
his opinion, public domain and large tracts of privately owned land
in New Mexico could be.put."2o
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Whatever his own actions, Dorsey did present clear and concise
suggestions as to a proper mode of adjudicating land grant claims
in New Mexico. He suggested a tribunal, which was clearly a
forerunner of the Court of Private Land Claims later created for
that purpose. 21 Julian, on the other hand, took the position that
Congress should refer all cases to the Secretary of the Interior for
final decision;22 nevertheless, his pugnacious role in bringing
clearly into focus the need for these settlements was the opening
wedge in the eventual creation of the Court.
As stated, Julian was a good Government man, so perhaps it
was inevitable that his loyalty to his superior should dictate his
advocacy of this method of settlement. One has the feeling that
this plan might have worked had it been applied from the beginning, but that to saddle an already overburdened Washington department with this onerous responsibility, given the complications
added by the passage of time, would have been unwise policy. Of
more importance, a procedure was finally adopted and, ironically,
each of these bitter disputants had a part in bringing it about.
Two happenings in 1890 helped bring the land court to reality
the following year. The first was an address on January 6 at Santa
Fe entitled "The Land Titles in New Mexico" by Frank W.
Springer, retiring president of the New Mexico Bar Association.
While rebuking Julian, he called urgently for final settlement of
grant boundaries and titles, the very thing that Julian had most
wanted. Significantly, the divergent pressures of Julian, Dorsey,
and Springer were taking effect, and the long delay was drawing inexorably to a close. Later in 1890 a delegation of New Mexicans
to Washington urging statehood failed in its primary mission
but was more successful in urging the creation of a land court. It
was established the following year.
Julian had also named five patented grants as being largely excessive and singled out the Maxwell Grant for particular attention. 23 The most extensive analysis of the validity of this grant was
made by Harold H. Dunham,24 who precedes his analysis of the
Maxwell Grant title with the general conclusion that fraudulent
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methods were used extensively to manufacture grant titles in New
Mexico. This proposition does not appear to stand up under careful scrutiny. Dunham thought it astonishing that the Kearny Code
provided for establishment of an office of Register of Lands, which
office was filled by Secretary of the Territory Donaciano Vigil. It
became Vigil's duty to record all papers and documents then in the
archives issued by the Spanish and Mexican governments. Dunham considers it significant that, in addition, every person in the
Territory claiming a land grant was permitted to have his muniments of title recorded. He believes that this permissive feature
left the door open to fraud. 25 His premise, while unstated, appears
to be that valid claims would already have been recorded under the
governments of Spain or Mexico.
To take for granted that an alien government taking over a new
land would have proceeded under such an assumption appears to
this writer to be a very dubious idea. It would have been more
reasonable to invite submission of all possible claims and then to
judge each on its merits, which is what was subsequently done.
The instructions to William Pelham, the first surveyor general;
required him to publicly proclaim that written notice of the details
of all claims must be §ubmitted to the surveyor general's office.
Pelham was directed to safeguard all files and to permit access only
to landowners who might find it necessary to refer to their title
records. So, in effect, there was an entirely clean slate under
American government regardless of what might have appeared in
the old records. Nevertheless, the old records were carefully protected and available for comparison.
In pursuance of his imputations alleging fraud in general,
Dunham cites a letter of December 12, 1848, from an American
Army officer in Santa Fe reporting unspecified fabrication of
grant titles. 26 Pelham's instructions referred to this same letter and
he was put on notice that: "It will be your duty to subject all
papers under suspicion of fraud to the severest scrutiny and test, in
order to settle the question of their genuineness."27 Dunham maintains that this letter from Santa Fe was officially corroborated by
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Indian Agent James S. Calhoun. Calhoun made unsupported
references to "spurious claims" and "fictitious grants"28 which
were hardly an official corroboration of anything.
Dunham further states that fraud became evident in eleven
Pueblo claims, based on title papers issued in 1689, when it was
shown that the signature of the Secretary of the Government was
obviously spurious because no such individual had then served as
secretary.29 The source of this information is Herbert O. Brayer,
who points out that this was of little fundamental consequence
because the removal o( the spurious documents, as the legal basis
for the Pueblo grants, established earlier ordinances as the fundamental basis for Pueblo land grants in New Mexico. Furthermore,
the essential purpose of the spurious documents had been to make
a specific grant to each Pueblo in accordance with a general
formula to be applied to all Pueblos. so
Such generalizations scarcely point to widespread fraudulent
manufacturing of grant titles. Equally misleading is the imputed
significance of blank samples of official stamped Mexican paper
which Ralph E. Twitchell obtained from "a New Mexican resident who, according to a notation by Mr. Twitchell was noted as
an 'expert in penmanship' during the first decade of American
occupation when the fabrication of grant documents was a common industry."sl This allegation is supported by no definite information, nor is the charge that "skilled penmanship continued to
be a fine art in the forgery and fabrication of documents in claims
before the Court of Private Land Claims."s2 William A. Keleher is
the source here and he offers no specific basis for this conclusion.ss
When Dunham finally comes to grips with the Maxwell Grant,
he states the most important information in a single sentence:
In passing it should be observed that although present title papers
superseded the former grant papers under peculiar circumstances, no
one can challenge the legality of existing titles~s4

In fairness, though, the thrust of his contentions should be set
forth. He sums up:
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[It] appears that the title to the Beaubien and Miranda grant was
manipulated after the American occupation of New Mexico. Moreover, since the evidence of Armijo's part ownership and Bent's part
ownership, as well as the record of the 1846 sale to the officers in
Kearny's Army, was not forwarded to Congress by the Surveyor
General's office, it is evident that Congress confirmed the grant without full knowledge of its disposition to 1860.35

Dunham's final conclusion is that the "official acceptance of
such papers was facilitated by the land registration provisions of
the Kearny Code and the later system established by the office of
Surveyor General of New Mexico."36 The complicated maneuver:ing over interests in ownership prior to submission of the grant to
Congress for confirmation does not alter the fact that a legal grant
had been made.. More germane is the size of the grant, and this will
be duly considered.
Dunham deduces with more validity that during Manuel
Armijo's governorship of New Mexico under Mexico there was an
attempt, possibly motivated by some degree of patriotism, to create
a buffer against westward-moving Americans by making large
land grants in the path of the movement. 37 This idea was earlier
promulgated by Ralph E. Twitchel1. 38 Morris F. Taylor summarizeswith added twists of his own:
There was an easy chance taken that if American sovereignty should
be extended south of the Arkansas, existing patterns of land owner.ship would not be seriously disturbed, and a favored few would have
control of tracts far larger than those permissible under American
law. At any rate, the first American system of law imposed on New
Mexico, The Laws of the Territory of New Mexico (commonly
known as the Kearny Code) promulgated on October 7, 1846, provided for the preservation of such land patterns, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848, did the same.39

That such grants were made is undeniable. Heretofore overlooked, however, is the relative magnitude of the 8,062,757 acres
in 41 claims granted by Armijo ill ten years, by far the largest
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percentage in his last two years. These figures are for New Mexico;
there was additional land in Colorado. This is more than a third of
the 22,063,211 acres of claims granted by all authorities of both
Spain and Mexico in 160 years. 40
Questionable, though, was his authority to make these grants
for an area of more than eleven square leagues, or about 48,000
acres, to each claimant as stipulated by the Mexican Colonization
Law of August 18, 1824, and the regulation for acquisition of
property by foreigners of March 12, 1828. If, indeed, it was calculated that existing patterns of land ownership would not be seriously disturbed under United States law should it come into force,
the eleven square league provision might be thwarted. It worked
out as a practical reality that this became the case in some instances, although a vast amount of subsequent litigation bears testimony that such a prediction at the time could hardly have been
counted on as a certainty. But there is reason to believe Armijo
might have thought he could possibly justify this excessive acreage
even though New Mexico remained under Mexico.
Let us first understand exactly what grants this discussion encompasses. Despite the large amount of land granted by Armijo,
only nine claims in New Mexico and Colorado for 3,047,243
acres were patented by the United States Government. But only
four, the Maxwell (#15), Sangre de Cristo (#4), Las Animas
(#17), and Rio Don Carlos (#48), were claimed for an amount
exceeding the eleven square league provision. The only grant made
prior to Armijo's governorship claimed for an amount in excess of
that provision was the Tierra Amarilla (#3). Of the five, only the
Maxwell, Sangre de Cristo, and Tierra Amarilla were patented for
amounts in apparent violation of the eleven square league provision. 41 Reading generally about New Mexico land grants, one gets
the impression that they were far more numerous.
There has been no substantial reason advanced for belief that
requests for the Sangre de Cristo and Tierra Amarilla grants were
not substantially the amount that was approved by a surveyor
general and later confirmed and patented by the United States
Congress. There has been, however, considerable conjecture that
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the Maxwell Grant was patented for more land than was requested. Names associated with the early history of the Maxwell
Grant include Carlos Beaubien and Charles Bent. These were
Mountain Men who knew the geography of northern New Mexico
and southern Colorado better than most tourists do today with a
road map. In those days, if one didn't watch where he was going
he damn well got lost.
How much land was requested in the case of the Maxwell
Grant? The boundaries of the grant, as described in the original
petition, were as follows:
Commencing below the junction of the Rayado river with the
Colorado, and in a direct line toward the east to the first hills, and
from there running parallel with said river Colorado in a northerly
direction to opposite the point of the Una de Gato, following the
same river along the same hills, to continue to the east of said Una
de Gato river to the summit of the table-land (mesa); from whence,
turning northwest, to follow along said summit until it reaches the
top of the mountain which divides the waters of the rivers running
toward the east from those running toward the west, and from
thence, following the line of said mountain in a southwardly direction until it intersects the first hill south of the Rayado river, and
following the summit of said hill toward the place of beginning. 42

If one tried to follow this description from certain landmarks
as they are known today one would, again, be lost. But consider
this: The surveyor general maps down to 1876 show the Rayado
to be the present Cimarron, while the Colorado is the present
Canadian. Now go back, making these two substitutions, and
the description follows closely the boundaries as they were
patented.
What mesa is more prominent than that north and west of
Raton? It has been surmised that the description must have referred to the mountains east of the Moreno Valley,43 but these
have no watercourses running toward the west. The description
could only refer to the Continental Divide where the patented
boundary was located. There might be some question as to how
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far south of the Rayado (Cimarron) the line was meant to run;
however, Agua Fria Peak is prominent enough to be noted on
maps today and the patented boundary intersects that peak
It is true that in 1844 Beaubien went on record as claiming
only seventeen or eighteen square leagues. This disclaimer was
in a petition to have the grant reinstated after it was suspended
following a protest by Padre Antonio Jose Martinez as to its illegally large size. The grant was reinstated to all rights of possession
with no clarification made as to size. It is probable that Beaubien's
petition professing the smaller size was made with tongue in cheek
only to gain reinstatement. Despite this contradiction, it doesn't
strain credulity to believe that the grantees knew exactly what
they were asking for, at least concerning the Maxwell, Tierra
Amarilla, and Sangre de Cristo grants.
But the question remains: Why were these three grants approved by Congress for substantially the amount requested while
the Las Animas and Rio Don Carlos were limited by the eleven
square league provision? No better reason has yet been advanced
than that by Morris F. Taylor. Their origins were so similar that
it would seem some of the grantees and their successors had more
influence in Washington than others. "And it should be noted
that the Vigil and St. Vrain [Las Animas] and the Nolan No. 48
[Rio Don Carlos] were north of the Raton Mountains and east of
the Sangre de Cristos, a region in which Spanish-Mexican culture
had not taken deep root. Perhaps there was tacit agreement in
Washington that those two grants might better be left mainly as
public domain and subject to American laws."44
An examination of the language used in surveyor general approval of these grants helps to explain the similarity of their origins and, as we shall see, points toward a reason why Governor
Armijo may have thought their largeness could be sustained under
Mexican law. The Rio Don Carlos was the last of the five to be
approved, which was done in 1860 by Surveyor General Wilbar.
In recommending the grant he raised no question of Mexican
law, saying that the papers were in order, and then referred to
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implied extraordinary powers of the governor in making grants
of land. He specified
that the supreme authority of New Spain-afterward the Republic
of Mexico-exercised from time immemorial certain prerogatives and
powers which, although not positively sanctioned by congressional
enactments, were universally conceded by the Spanish and Mexican
governments; and there being no evidence that these prerogatives
and powers were revoked or repealed by the supreme authorities,
it is to be presumed that the exercise of them was lawful. The subordinate authorities of the provinces implicitly obeyed these orders
of the governors, which were continued for so long a period that
they became the universal custom or unwritten law of the land
wherein they did not conflict with any subsequent congressional
enactment.45

Wilbar's emphasis on the extraordinary power of the governor
had precedents in Surveyor General Pelham's approval of the
Sangre de Cristo Grant in 1856 and of the Las Animas Grant
in 1857. On the same day he approved theLas Animas GrantSeptember 17-he also recommended the Maxwell Grant. In the
Maxwell instance he made no mention of the prerogatives of supreme authority in remote provinces simply saying that Armijo
had, " 'in conformity with the laws,' granted the land to the petitioners to make such use of it as they saw proper."46 Pelham followed language of comparable tenor in his recommendation of
the Tierra Amarilla Grant.
The provincial deputation was authorized by the laws of the
Republic of Mexico to make donations of land to individuals; and
this case being covered by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of J. c. Fremont vs.· the United States, the grant made to Manuel
Martinez of which Francisco Martinez is the present claimant is
deemed by this office to be a good and valid grant and the Congress
of the United States is hereby respectfully recommended to con-
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firm same and cause a patent to be issued therefor, and the land
embraced within the boundaries set forth in said grant to be
observed [surveyed?].47

Significantly, in no instance did either Pelham or Wilbar raise
any question about the eleven square league provision. It is possible that they were not aware of it, at least in any detail. While
instructions to them were detailed in many regards, they apparently received none (other than what might be gleaned from
legal references) about this limiting regulation. At that time it
apparently was not in the forefront of the minds of land officials.
Had it been as controversial then as it became at a later date, very
likely the limiting feature would have been carefully delineated.
But as late as 1873, Surveyor General James K. Proudfit wrote that
"This office is not supplied with any laws or reports of law decisions, either Spanish, Mexican or American, except the United
States Statutes at Large, nor is counsel provided for the United
States ... I have not been able to find, and have never seen the
Act said to have been made by the Mexican Congress, August 18,
1824, or the regulations said to have been made under it."48
So it cannot be assumed that either Pelham or Wilbar was part
of any sinister plot to thwart adherence to the eleven square
league provision. Some clue is provided in what they did say
rather than what they did not say. The approval of the Rio Don
Carlos, Sangre de Cristo, and Las Animas grants referred to the
extraordinary powers of the governor, while the Maxwell and
Tierra Amarilla approvals simply stated, in effect, that the laws
had been complied with. The most reasonable assumption is that
Pelham and Wilbar followed the thrust of their instructions, and
of contemporary thinking, in their decisions for approval.
There is a reason why the eleven square league provision may
have been so universally ignored at this time. In 1879 Emilio
Pardo, a Mexican attorney, in a communication to William Pinkerton, prominent New Mexico land grant speculator, stated his
opinion that the Colonization Law of 1824 had been abrogated
by a Mexican law of April 4, 1837.49
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There can be little doubt that Governor Armijo was aware of
this question when he made the grants, and it is also possible
that Washington officials, no more than a decade later, were
silent in the matter in their instructions to the surveyor general
because of a prevailing feeling that the law had been abrogated.
In the late r890'S the United States Supreme Court, while stating
the difficulty of the problem, largely skirted the issue. The opinions more or less support Pardo's position even though they reject certain appeals from the Court of Private Land Claims on
other legal grounds. 50 A portion of one opinion sheds much light
on the difficulty of the problem and presents the situation as it
may well have been vJewed by Governor Armijo, hence his approval of several grants in excess of the eleven square league
provision.
In viewing questions arising out of Mexican laws relating to
land titles we recognize what an exceedingly difficult matter it is
to determine with anything like certainty what laws were in force
in Mexico at any particular time prior to the occupation of the
country by Americans in 1846-1848. This difficulty exists because
of the frequent political changes which took place in that country
from the time the Spanish rule was first thrown down to the American occupation. Revolutions and counter-revolutions, empires and
republics, followed each other with great rapidity and in bewildering
confusion, and emperors, presidents, generals and dictators, each for
a short period, played the foremost part in a country where revolution seems during that time to have been the natural order of things.
Among the first acts of each government was generally one repealing
and nullifying all those of its predecessors.51

There is precedent in Supreme Court OpInIOnS specifically
concurring with Armijo's approvals. Justice McKenna said: "by
a law passed April 4, r837, all colonization laws were certainly
modified and may be repealed."52 Justice Lamar considered this
question at length:
Passing now to the merits of the controversy, the first question to
be disposed of relates to the patented grant of the defendant. We
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have already stated that, in the Maxwell Land. Grant Case, it was
held that the grant to Beaubien and Miranda, which is the foundation of the defendant's title, was a valid grant, and that the decision
of the court in that case is not directly assailed. The effect of the
decision in that case, however, is evidently misunderstood by the
appellant; for one of the main points urged on this appeal is, that
that grant was void ab initio, for the reason that, being an alleged
empresario grant, authority for it must be found in the colonization
laws of Mexico, and those laws had been repealed by a law of the
Republic passed in 1837, four years prior to the date of that grant.
It· becomes necessary, therefore, to state with some degree of particularity what was actually decided in that case.
A reference to that decision will show that the validity of the
grant was one of the principal questions there considered. As stated
in the opinion, the first question presented for consideration was:
'Do the colonization laws of Mexico, in force at the time the grant
was made to Beaubien and Miranda, namely, the decree of the
Mexican Congress of August 18, 1824, and the general rules and
regulations for the colonization of the territories of the Republic of
Mexico of November 21, 1828, render this grant void, notwithstanding its confirmation by the Congress of the United States?' 121 U. S.
360. The court then discussed that question very fully, and came
to the conclusion that the grant certainly partook very largely of
the nature of an empresario grant, and was evidently so considered
by Congress when it was confirmed. . . . But the decision was not
rested solely upon the fact that the grant was generally understood
to be an empresario grant, but upon the proposition that the action
of Congress in confirming it as made to Beaubien and Miranda,
and as reported for confirmation by the surveyor general of New
Mexico, without any qualification or limitation as to its extent, was
conclusive upon the court. In this connection the court said, (pp.
36,-6:) 'But whether, as a matter of fact, this was a grant, not limited
in quantity, by the Mexican decree of 1824, or whether it was a
grant which in strict law would have been held by the Mexican
government, if it had continued in the ownership of the property,
to have been subject to that limitation, it is not necessary to decide
at this time. By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, under which the
United States acquired the right of property in all the public lands
of that portion of New Mexico which was ceded to this country,
it became its right, it had the authority, and it engaged itself by
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that treaty to confinn valid Mexican grants. If, therefore, the great
surplus which it is claimed was conveyed by its patent to Beaubien
and Miranda was the p!-"operty of the United States, and Congress
acting in its sovereign capacity upon the question of the validity
of the grant, chose to treat it as valid for the boundaries given to it
by the Mexican governor, it is not for the judicial department of
this government to controvert their power to do so;' citing Tameling
v. United States Freehold &c. Co., 93 U. S. 644. 53

So it cannot come as a complete surprise that "Armijo's approvals of land grant petitions suggest, in their brevity and perfunctoriness, that he acted on such a premise" as the extraordinary
powers of the governor, as implied in surveyor general approvals.
The form of the grants he made indicates that he may have had,
or could assume, some freedom of hand in his granting powers.
But "it is difficult to believe that the extent of a claim would not
have been clarified in terms of Mexican land laws before final
confirmation could have been obtained from the Republic of
Mexico. That, of course, is an academic point, because sovereignty
changed so soon after the grants were made."54 Armijo may have
considered the possibility of later gaining Mexican congressional
approval. One can conjecture what might have been the course
of events had New Mexico remained under Mexico. Certainly,
ultimate solutions would have been required just as was the case
under United States control.
The development of these solutions under United States government is evidence of the complications that can arise in jurisprudence. The first patent issued to any of the five grants was
made to the Rio Don Carlos on March 3, 1875, and limitation
to 48,000 acres reflected an interpretation of Mexican law that
would seem to have provided guidelines for settlement of future
cases, but a civil suit then in progress would alter the circumstances. The United States Freehold and Emigration Company
had commenced litigation to evict John G. Tameling from a parcel
of land in the Sangre de Cristo Grant claimed by that company.
The case was finally taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1876. In finding against Tameling the high court rested
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its opinion on the doctrine that the Act of Congress confirming
it constituted, in effect, a new grant, and, there being no limitation
in the Act, it became effectual and operative for the entire tract
recommended by the surveyor general notwithstanding the eleven
square league restriction. 55
Whatever its logic, or however much it may have circumscribed
the will of Congress, the decision probably made inevitable that
the claimants to the Sangre de Cristo, Maxwell, and Tierra Amarilla grants would receive the entire acreage within their alleged
outboundaries. Any question of validity under Mexican law was
irrelevant when Congress created a grant de novo-a new grant.
The Tameling decision did not apply to the Las Animas nor to
the Rio Don Carlos grants which had been limited by the earlier
acts which had confirmed them for an amount in keeping with
the limiting provision of Mexican law. 56
The T ameling ruling became a key factor in the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States in upholding the Maxwell Grant patent in 1887, and was also decisive in litigation aimed
at setting aside the patent to the Tierra Amarilla Grant. In 1885,
with the start of Grover Cleveland's first administration, there
commenced nearly a decade of controversy in which the patent
was unsuccessfully attacked by the United States Government.
Surveyor General Julian followed up an accusation brought to
his attention that, based on the Wheeler and Hayden geological
survey, there was an excess of about 60,000 acres in the grant
because of an improper survey of the eastern boundary. Julian reported that not only was this accusation justified, but also that
there were three other good reasons why the patent should be
vacated. He maintained that the patented survey included the
pasture, woods, and watering places which, under the grant, were
left free and common to all with the fee reserved by the Mexican
Government. Furthermore, the grant was made under the Colonization Law of 1824 and the regulation of 1828, and therefore it
should be restricted to eleven square leagues. Julian also alleged
that the recommendation of the surveyor general for confirmation
by Congress did not show what grant he considered to be good
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and valid; consequently Congress was left entirely in the fog as
to what land was meant. 57
The Tierra Amarilla Grant has been acclaimed as the cause
celebre of injustices to grant heirs. Blame has even been cast on
the United States for violating its treaty with Mexico. Title to
the grant came into Thomas B. Catron, who has been widely
charged with chicanery in his methods of acquisition. These included purchases at delinquent tax sales, purchase of quitclaim
deeds from claimants of remote interests, and actions in court.
With at least forty-two conveyances, he acquired all interests in
the grant. For these he paid nearly $200,000, largely with borrowed
money. 58
It has been popularly supposed that Catron virtually stole much
of the land that he acquired in the form of land grants. This is not
substantiated in the case of the Tierra Amarilla. Land grants were
sold for minimal amounts in the 1860'S and the first few years of
the 1870'S, but prospective sellers seem to have realized the potential
value of property by the middle 1870'S. Persons who were initially
satisfied with the price they received later thought they had been
bilked when the economy of the Territory became more afHuent,
and the price of land increased.59

Gilberto Espinosa, Albuquerque attorney, has stated, with reference to Catron's methods of acquiring land:
These facts perturb me little, despite that fact that the original
Grantee, Jose Manuel Martinez, was the great-grant [great?] grandfather of my mother, Rafaela Martinez. If my Martinez ancestors
abandoned their interests, neglected to occupy these lands or failed
to pay taxes, or parted with their interests by selling their birthright
for a mess of pottage, there is little that can be done now to disturb
these long established titles. One thing is certain, no violation of
Treaty rights is involved.
Assuming the rights of these heirs have been trespassed upon,
in the name of reason why should anyone who is not a descendant
or transferee of Jose Manuel Martinez question this alleged fraud or
complain of violations of his inheritable rights to lands his ancestors
never heard Of?60
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Espinosa's contention does not go unchallenged. A counterclaim holds that Spanish (and in tum Mexican) law made title
to the common lands subject to usufruct. "Usufruct can be owned
in common, but the owners do not possess the land; they possess
the right to use it."61 The assertion continues that this legal right
should have been maintained by the United States government
because of its obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Had this been done instead of making such land part of the public
domain for granting purposes, grantees of community grants, and
their heirs, would not have had the right to sell land thus held
in common.
All of this involves legal questions entirely too lengthy to be
presented here in detail; nevertheless, Michael J. Rock has presented a sound case holding that decisions of the New Mexico
Supreme Court have evaded this issue when that Court could
have defined and established usufructary right over common lands
had it faced the issue squarely. He contends with justification
that, for all practical purposes, the only remedy for those who
might seek it is action by the United States Congress. 62
As a result of the United States Government's effort to set
aside the patent to the grant, Catron engaged the services of James
M. Freeman, a Denver attorney, to protect the title to his property. Freeman commenced his argument by calling attention to
a well-settled rule of law that a suit to vacate a patent can only be
successfully maintained upon a ground of fraud or mistake, and
then showed clearly that there had been neither in the Tierra
Amarilla Grant patent controversy. He continued:
There is no specific allegation of fraud in this case against either
the Surveyor General or the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, nor does it appear that the claimants were consulted in the
execution of the survey upon which the patent was issued, but on
the contrary it was a proceeding by the Government from begining to end. 6s
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Freeman also pointed out his failure to see where the case in
question differed from that of the Sangre de Cristo, confirmed by
the same Act of Congress which confirmed the Tierra Amarilla
Grant and in precisely the same language. He concluded his argument by referring to the recent Supreme Court decision in the
Maxwell Grant case.
That grant was confirmed by the same Act of Congress as the
Tierra Amarilla. In fact it appears in the same line of the same
section and the principle of that decision should govern in this case
because there was not only an allegation of fraud there but there
was also an allegation that the survey was largely in excess of what
was granted and confirmed. 64

Catron eventually prevailed in his effort to protect title to his
property, but only after it became evident that the action was a
petty prosecution prolonged by personal spite on the part of
Secretary of the Interior John W. Noble. 65
Despite this explanation, it is possible that die-hard detractors
will still consider Tierra Amarilla Grant transactions as the personification of land grant evils and use it as a scale for measuring
alleged malfeasance throughout the entire spectrum of land grant
dealings. This is not to say that there may not have been wrongdoing; it is to say that constructions of wickedness have been generally attached to an unwarranted degree. This writer here renews
his long-standing invitation for interested persons to submit documented examples of land grant chicanery. Such examples should
be-brought to light; conversely, unwarranted and unsubstantiated
generalizations should be exposed, for they are as mischievous
in their way as the alleged corruption they are aimed against.
To adequately sum up this study, certain statistics are necessary.
Statistics can be interesting if they are startling enough and those
related to the land grants of New Mexico are, indeed, startling.
In the 127 years from 1693 through 1820 there were 130 grants
totaling 8,675,050 acres of land claimed from Spain. In the 32
years from 1821 through 1853, there were only 76 grants claimed
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from Mexico, but these totaled 61.455,617 acres of land. This
includes three small grants made by the United States: The Arkansas Colony or Beales' claim of 45,000,000 acres; the Ufia de
Gato Grant of 600,000 acres; and the Peralta Grant of which
there was an estimated 2,467.456 acres in New Mexico. These
three grants, all claimed from Mexico, were subsquently determined to be fraudulent. While only three in number, their total
acreage is a shocking revelation of the avarice possessed by some
individuals, when one realizes that only 13,388,161 acres were
actually granted by Mexico. Thus there were 70,130,667 acres
claimed as grants. There are only 77,568,640 acres of land in
New Mexico. There were 7,4°1,63766 acres of patented land
grants prior to the adjudications of the Court of Private Land
Claims. Therefore, exclusive of the Arkansas Colony and Ufia
de Gato claims, which were never submitted to that Court, there
were 17,129,°3° acres claimed but not yet patented when the
Court began its work. It is interesting to note that nearly the
same amount, 17,358,°34 acres, was submitted in claims presented to the Court, even though several grants claimed earlier
were never submitted, and approximately the same number not
claimed earlier were submitted. 67
The Las Vegas Grant was patented by the General Land Office
in 1903, and this claim, added to the area approved by the Court
of Private Land Claims and the United States Congress, makes
the total 9,768,277 acres. Compared to the area claimed, this is
a relatively small amount, especially when one considers that
some seventy-five per cent was approved by the somewhat impetuous action of Congress.
Further comparison shrinks the appearance of these patented
grants even more. There have been large amounts of other land
in New Mexico granted to entities other than individuals. These
include 43,492,683 acres in Indian, Federal and State land,68
as well as 3,59°,281 acres granted for railroad purposes. Then
too, in the heyday of the public land disposal program, there were
6,256,486 acres benefitting individuals for varying lengths of
time by virtue of unlawful inclosures of the public domain and
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uncompleted entries under the land laws. These were used somewhat in the same manner as Spanish and Mexican grants that
were claimed but not yet patented. These, added to the 70,130,667
acres of land grant claims, total 123,470,117 acres of land claimed
at one time or another in New Mexico.
If we consider only land to which title was actually conveyed
(Indian, Federal, State, railroad and patented grants), we still·
have 56,851,241 acres, or seventy-three per cent of the land in
New Mexico. This seems, by any reckoning, a startling dispersal
of our landed patrimony. This is neither a condemnation nor
an approval of that dispersal; rather, an indication that the 9,768,277 acres in patented Spanish and Mexican land grants was not
relatively quite so large an amount as has been generally imagined.
The area claimed but not yet patented, however, was of far
greater significance to the advancement of New Mexico. Federal
land laws decreed that any claims be reserved from settlement
and public disposal until they were adjudicated by the Federal
Government. As a consequence, settlers could never be certain
that they were not settling on land that was claimed, or might
later be claimed, as a private grant. This situation was widely
known throughout the nation and resulted in a
'deep and acknowledged distrust of land titles in New Mexico....'
that retarded immigration and rapid settlement of the Territory.
Likewise, owners of valid claims could realize only depreciated
prices on their property. The only ones who stood to profit by the
delay and uncertainty were holders of doubtful claims, who had
use of the land until true ownership was legally determined. 69

This brings up the final question: To what extent were these
claimed grants fraudulent? Before the work of the Court of Private Land Claims, it was commonly believed that many of the
grants were illegal, forged, or fraudulent, and that the Court
would so find. To the contrary, the Court found that the notorious Peralta Grant involving James Addison Reavis was the only
one to fit this description. It should be noted that the fraudulent
nature of a few grants was established prior to the adjudications
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of the Court. Among these were the U 5a de Gato and Arkansas
Colony claims. The latter was alleged to have been made by the
governor of Chihuahua and Texas to Beales and Royuela in 1832.
Of this grant Surveyor General George W. Julian wrote, in 1889:
such a claim was filed in this office several years ago, but it has never
been acted upon, or recognized in any manner by the government,
for the reason that it is palpably fraudulent and invalid. The ground
claimed has mostly been surveyed and taken up under our public
land laws by private individuals, who, it is safe to say, will never
be disturbed in the possession of their homes by any claimant under
this alleged 'Arkansas grant.'70

How is it then that the Court validated only a fraction of the
amount submitted for adjudication? Besides the aforementioned
stretching of boundaries, a number of grants were made by officials without proper authority to do so, although the grants were
made in good faith.
Under such conditions many grants, made perhaps a century
before the court was established, had existed with titles undisputed
by the people and by the Government under which they were
granted, and in strict equity were justly entitled to be held good,
but had to be rejected by the court, which required proof of strict
legal authority in the granting powers, and a rigid compliance with
the law in the form and manner of its execution.71

To conclude that fraud in New Mexican land grants was
largely confined to stretching of boundaries may tamper with the
cherished tradition that grant titles were manufactured wholesale; nevertheless, these enlargements involved millions of acres
of land and affected the destiny of New Mexico for half a century. This practice, together with the abundant infighting among
grant claimants over who would get what, can better be described
by the appellation "greed" rather than "fraud." .Reprehensible
as this practice was, the greater crime was the apathy of Congress
in allowing grants to remain for so long in an unsettled condition.
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This illustrates the truism that greed and apathy can be more
devastating in their consequences than outright attempts to defraud. Fraud is more easily detected and corrected, and this is
amply borne out by the long and muddled history of land grants
in New Mexico.
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DURANGO AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
PAUL EISBR-VIAPOllA

IN

1927 Lyford P. Edwards, an early student of revolution
cogently argued that revolutions do not produce social change, but
rather that they are an indication that vast changes have already
occurred within a society. 1 It is sixty-four years since the outbreak
of the Mexican Revolution, one of the £rst social revolutions of the
twentieth century. Since then a vast amount of scholarly work has
focused on the Revolution, but it is only within the last six or
seven years that a new generation of Mexicanists has begun to
examine in minute detail its internal mechanisms. The revolutionary movement was highly eclectic, and lacked a coherent
ideology on the national level, but many historians of the Revolution have treated it as if there were such an ideology. The scrcalled
"custodians of the Revolution" have consistently maintained that
the primary impetus for the Revolution was political oppression by
the regime of Por£rio Diaz. In general, this has been widely accepted until recently when revisionist students of Mexican history
have become increasingly critical of this outlook. New interest in
the Por£riato indicates that "the Diaz dictatorship is properly the
formative era of modem Mexico."2 Nevertheless, our understanding of the dynamics of the "Age of Diaz" is far from satisfying. As
Anthony Byran notes:
the sophistication of mid-twentieth century historical investigation
notwithstanding, many serious gaps exist in our knowledge of the
Dfaz era-yet it -is on this tenuous basis that many have chosen to
erect their arguments about _the origins and progress of the
Revolution.3
.
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In order to remedy this situation, a rewarding approach would
be to examine the origins of the Revolution on the local and state
level. We need to know much more about the workings of the
Diaz political system in this regard. What role did the governor
play in the political system? How effective was he? Was he simply
a "yes man" who carried out Don Porfirio's instructions from
Mexico City or was he permitted some degree of autonomy? What
were his relationships with the local jefes politicos? Were they
appointed or elected, and how much influence did the governor
exercise over them? What roles did the rurales and the regular
army play in local politics?
We also need to know a great deal more about the process of
socioeconomic development at the state level. What effect did the
arrival of the railroads have on local economy? How did foreign
and native capital affect the development of regional economies?
What was the role of the mining sector; what the effect of the
division of the agricultural sector into traditional and commercial,
entrepreneurial haciendas, upon tenure patterns? Were the peasants being driven off their lands, and to what extent were communal Indian ejidos alienated? How do we explain the tremendous growth of the ranchero class, and what accelerated or retarded
the development of this new social group in the various states?
Much further research is required about the development of local
groups in opposition to DIaz' modernization poliCies and their part
in the disintegration of Porfirian Mexico.
The Mexican Revolution, after all, was not a revolution, but
rather a series of mini-revolutions directed at local and regional
grievances. While many of the grievances were national in scope,
they often assumed peculiar local characteristics. Few Mexicanists,
I think, would dispute that the local conditions which sparked the
Zapatista uprising in the south and the Villista rebellion in the
north were similar in some aspects. Nevertheless they can best be
comprehended when one studies their dissimilarities.
Most students of modernization would agree that a successful
revolution is highly dependent upon the disintegration of the
traditional social order-a rotting corpse being much easier to
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destroy than a healthy body.4 In Durango, the traditional social
order, based on an hacendado-controlled cattle grazing economy,
was seriously undermined by the onset of modernization which
resulted from the impingement of exogenous economic forces, primarily North American, on the Durangueno economy. The Diaz
policy of encouraging and abetting the investment of foreign
capital in the Mexican economy accelerated the process.
With the return of stable political conditions that marked the
rise of Porfirio Diaz, U. S. capital began to pour into Durango. By
1880 North American interests had replaced British in controlling
Durango's mining sector. When the railroads reached the Laguna
region of Durango in the 1880'S and 1890's, North American
capital began to be invested in the rapidly expanding commercial
agricultural sector. The entrance of massive amounts of U. S.
capital had serious repercussions for the old order. American
control of the mining industry tied the state's economy to an
increasingly erratic world silver market, and the fall in the price of
silver after 1890 led to widespread unemployment. In commercial
agriculture, the growth of capital-intensive joint-stock-company
haciendas eventually destroyed the old hacendado-client relationship when rapacious, entrepreneurial hacendados began pushing
the peasants off the land, and taking over crucial water rights in
the very dry Laguna region. They deliberately abolished the old
debt-peonage labor system in favor of a more mobile wage-labor
force. This, coupled with the avaricious land policies of the
hacendados, rent the fabric of the old rural social order.
Almost inevitably economic power seeks political power. The
new hacendados proceeded to do just that. In the Laguna region
most municipalities were controlled either directly or indirectly
by the commercial agricultural elite. At the state level the dominance of American capital was aided and protected by the Diaz
governors, who had dose ties to both the mining and commercial
agriculture sectors. This led to increasing unrest among the miners
and the new rural agricultural proletariat, not to mention the
middle-sector groups of Ciudad Durango who saw themselves
bypassed when the economic focus of the state shifted to the
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Laguna. Side effects of these changes were the development of
middle-sector opposition parties in the state capital, the rise of
highly vocal anti-American sentiment, increasing rural violence,
and finally, revolution.
Any study of Durango must include a survey of the land, for
the land question is of paramount importance in comprehending
the course of the Revolution. Situated just south of Chihuahua
and east of Sinaloa, Durango encompasses 123,52° square kilometers, but only 25,000 to 30,000 square kilometers are arable.
The Sierra Madre and the lack of adequate rainfall help account
for the shortage of agriculturally fertile land. The most important
area is the Oriente, or Arid Zone (Laguna), in the east. Prior
to 1 876 these factors, particularly the absence of sufficient rainfall, led to the development of an hacienda-based cattle economy.
Shortage of water was a handicap that could only be surmounted
by an extensive irrigation system necessitating large amounts
of capita1.5
Efforts to alleviate the water shortage in the Laguna began in
the late 1840'S, when three hacendados commenced the damming of the Nazas River. In time this led to the creation of an
extensive irrigation system. With the introduction of cotton an
important plantation economy began to evolve. The development of the Laguna from an arid wasteland to a highly profitable
plantation economy triggered precipitous escalation in land values
and population. At the outset of the Porfiriato, land in the Laguna
could be purchased for one peso per hectare. By 191o first-class
land was commanding 202 pesos per hectare. In fact, land in
the Laguna became so valuable that many hacendados preferred
to rent out their land rather than cultivate it, simply because it
brought a higher retum. 6
During the Porfiriato, Durango's population grew rapidly, but
unlike the majority of Mexican states, whose population increases
were greatest during the initial years of the DIaz regime, Durango's population increased more in the later period. Ciudad
Durango, however, remained stagnant, while the Laguna experienced a tremendous rise in population. Lerdo, for example,
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tripled its population between 1882 and 1910, and nearby
Mapimf increased a hundredfold;7 The principal factor in slowing
population growth dmoing the early period is usually thought to
be the effect of Indian raids, which lasted into the 1880'S. Other
factors were the wars of the Reforma, numerous epidemics, and
lack of an adequate transportation network in northern Mexico. 8
After 1884 the establishment of peace and the development of
a transportation network stimulated Durango's population increase. The building of the Mexican Central and Mexican International Railroads between 1882 and 1892 linked Durango with
the rest of Mexico for the first time. At the same time the growth
of commercial agriculture and the mining industry lured thousands of immigrants to the state. 9 Nevertheless, Durango retained
its rural character and, unlike some states, never developed an
urban complex. Io
The absence of adequate transportation was a major factor in
hindering economic development. Before 1870 Durango was
virtually cut off from Mexico City. Pack mules were the principal method of transportation and more than 60,000 of these
animals were used in the Durango-Chihuahua trade. At the end
of the French intervention, the state slowly began to build the
economic foundation so vital for development. l l
The Mexican Central Railroad laid track through Torre6n in
1882; within ten years the Mexican International followed suit.
Basically, railroad construction followed an economic rationale.
More than any other single factor, the growth of commercial
agriculture in the Laguna determined the course of the railroads.
It was hardly accidental that both railroads converged in Torre6n,
in the heart of the prosperous Laguna, which was rapidly becoming the most dynamic part of the Durangueno economy. The
construction of ancillary lines was designed chieBy to cater to the
needs of the bl!rgeoning mining industry.I2 The railroads served
Durango's major economic interests well. Production increased
dramatically in the mining industry when the mines could ship out
lower grade ores for processing, which prohibitive transportation
costs had earlier prevented. Is The decision of both major railroads
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to lay track through the Laguna brought the region to the economic take-off stage and the final phase in the shift of the state's
economic center from Ciudad Durango to the Laguna.
In spite of the mining boom and accelerated growth of the
commercial cotton plantations in the 1890\ there was little improvement in commerce between 1896 and 191 I. Durango attained its commercial apogee in 1896 when the volume of trade
reached 5.7 million pesos; by 1904 it had declined to 3.5 million
pesos, and remained more or less static for the remainder of the
Porfiriato. 14
There are various reasons for this economic lag. First, the
state continued to rely heavily on the alcabala for revenue. Efforts
to abolish it had been initiated as early as 1866, but the resulting
loss of revenue threw the state's finances into such confusion that
after four years the alcabala was reintroduced. In addition, a number of internal taxes on the importation of foreign goods severely
restricted trade because they brought about an artificial rise in
prices. The mining industry entered into a period of marked decline after 1895 as a result of the downward trend of prices on
the world silver market. Now, with the railroads and most of the
major mines and industries, as well as commercial agriculture,
concentrated in the Laguna, it is highly probable that most of the
goods were shipped in and out of T orrean. If this is true, the
state's commercial decline was artificial rather than actual. 15
Durango's mining industry was concentrated in American
hands. Prior to 1880 the industry had been dominated by British
capital. Soon after the rise of Diaz, U. S. capital had poured into
the state. The pattern of development involved denouncing old
claims and then reworking them with modem technology. By far
the most important mineral was silver, which far outdistanced
other minerals in terms of total value. In 1902, for example, silver
production reached nearly 13 million pesos; while gold, its nearest
competitor, accounted for only 1.7 million pesos. The importance
of the domination of silver cannot be overestimated since it linked
the Durango mines to the erratic world silver market. 16
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In part, Durango's one-sided economic development can be attributed to overreliance on silver production. Between 1870 and
1910, Mexico poured more than $4°,000,000 worth of silver
into the world market. While silver production continued to rise,
demand began to decrease as one European country after another
renounced bimetalism and adopted the gold standard. In addition,
beginning in 1893, when business panic and depression rocked
the United States, Mexican silver reeled under a series of telling
blows. To make the situation even worse, the United States Congress repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the British
announced that their Indian mints would stop coining silver.
Furthermore, the Mexican peso, which had long been the standard currency in the Far East, began to lose its monopoly when the
Chinese decided to mint their own silver dollar. Finally, during
this same period the price of silver began a steady decline in the
United States, the major purchaser of Mexican silver. 17
The ramifications of the world silver crisis reached Durango
in the first decade of the twentieth century, forcing the shutdown
of a number of mines. Just prior to the Revolution, the Velardeiia
mines in the Laguna suspended operations, throwing over five
thousand miners out of work. In Parrilla, near Nombre de Dios,
the population rose and fell with the boom-and-bust cycle of the
local mines. In Tapia, Inde, and San Luis Ocampo, a number
of mines were closed and unemployment rose steadily. These and
numerous other closures dislocated many mineworkers, who were
now forced to roam the state in search of work. 18
Undoubtedly, the most significant cause determining the course
of the Revolution in Durango was the land problem. The emergence of the commercial agricultural plantation in the Laguna
exacerbated and accelerated the disruption of the traditional social
order which previously had rested upon a cattle-grazing economy.
In Durango, the population increase during the Porfiriato was
directly related to the increase in the number of ranchos. In 1893,
there were 571 ranchos in Durango, but by 1910 there were 2.458.
There was a definite geographical pattern in their development.
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The areas outside the Laguna witnessed the largest increase. A
partial explanation for this pattern is that in the areas which had
the largest number of rural property holders, the land tended to
be of inferior quality, and thus of little interest to the more commercially minded hacendados. Another important consideration
was the relative availability of unoccupied lands, owing to the
decline in population during the Indian raids. Finally, the majority of the large commercial haciendas were concentrated in
the Laguna, which left a sizeable portion of the state open to
the development of medium-sized ranchos. In fact, the districts
which contained the largest number of ranchos were also the districts with the fewest number of haciendas. 19
Without question, the large commercial plantation-hacienda
monopolized the land. Although there were I 55 haciendas in
1810, and a century later the number had declined to 143, the
increasing tendency of the haciendas to consolidate accounts for
this decline. Together, these haciendas controlled over 4,5°0,000
hectares of land in the Laguna alone. The majority were under
50,000 hectares, but the most important were in excess of 100,000
hectares. Furthermore, the average size of the Durango haciendas
was 51,725 hectares, well above the national average of 5,632
hectares. 20
Most of the large haciendas were situated in the Laguna; in
fact, of the ten largest haciendas in the state in 19 I 0, all were
located there. 21 Essentially, there were three types of haciendas
operating in the Laguna: the traditional hacienda, haciendas administered by companies to which the owners had rented the land,
and the joint-stock-company hacienda. Clearly, the most important
of these three was the foreign controlled joint-stock company. In
many respects these operations were quite distinct from their
traditional counterparts. On joint-stock-eompany haciendas labor
was paid a daily cash wage and each worker was provided with
a house and a few animals. Unlike their compadres who labored
on the traditional haciendas, the workers were not given subsistence agricultural plots, but neither were they attached to the soil
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through debt. The nature of the commercial cotton hacienda
demanded a highly mobile labor force, not one tied to the soil.
Nearly all supplies, including staples, were purchased outside the
hacienda. The laborer was paid a cash wage, not company store
script. These corporations felt that cash wages would stimulate
the development of labor specialization, which they considered
more efficient than the old debt peonage system. Thus the old
paternalistic relationship between the hacendado and his peones
was replaced by a capitalistic and impersonal system of wage labor.
The commercial hacienda, unlike its more traditional predecessor,
was not an independent political unit. Nevertheless, the commercial haciendas did wield tremendous political inRuence in the
local municipios, which for the most part, they managed to control outright. In the Laguna, the commercial haciendas created
a new class of owners, with a few mayordomos and a large rootless
rural proletariat. There was virtually no middle sector, and little
interchange between the owners and their workers; 'Moreover,
the increasing demand for labor brought a large number of immi~
grants who were no longer tied to the old system into the state.
This, coupled with the Ructuating water supply and the nonresident wage-labor system which these entrepreneurial hacendados introduced, produced a continous flow of internal and external migration and further hastened the decline of the old order. 22
The introduction of commercial agriculture created a constant
demand for more land and labor. Indeed, more than any other
single factor, the land encroachment and labor policies of the
commercial haciendas were responsible for the mounting tension
within the social structure. Throughout the Pornriato, the haciendas were constantly faced with labor shortages. To solve this problem, tlw hacendados adopted various tactics. Land encroachment
policies were designed not only to secure more land, but more
labor. The loss of village lands forced many landless peasants to
look to the commercial haciendas for employment. To meet their
labor needs the hacendados encouraged immigration. In the
Cuencame district alone, over five thousand immigrants tended
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the fields of the district's four major haciendas. Finally, a number
of hacendados, particularly in the northern Laguna, resorted to
various sharecropping schemes. 23
The continual expansion of the commercial haciendas at the
expense of the pueblos exacerbated existing social tensions. As
early as 1884 the pueblos of the Laguna marshaled protests against
the indiscriminate application of the 1884 Diaz land law, maintaining that the surveying companies were displacing legitimate
landholders in favor of the hacendados. Perhaps the best example
of this occurred in the district of Cuencame. On the eve of the
Revolution the population of the district was 41,000; yet Cuencame's free pueblos were all but defunct. Over one million hectares of land were in the domain of the district's twelve haciendas.
Much of this land had been acquired illegally with the aid of
sympathetic government officials like Governor Esteban Fernandez, who was instrumental in the expansion of the Hacienda de
Santa Clara. In fact, the situation in Cuencame had deteriorated
to such a degree that Governor Fernandez, fearing peasant uprisings, thought it wise to garrison troops in the district to preserve
order. 24
Along with the struggle for control of the land there was a
battle for control of the precious waters of the Rio Nazas. In
addition to fomenting commercial agriculture, the numerous
dams on the Nazas brought about the establishment of a number
of pueblos along the river. Assured of a plentiful water supply,
these pueblos prospered until construction of a new dam in 1880
threatened to cut off their water. The pueblos made numerous
protests to the Federal government calling for a halt to dam construction. The Secretaria de Gobernaci6n ordered a halt to construction of new dams on the Nazas. The hacendados, however,
were not to be denied. Ignoring the suspension order, they continued construction of the new dam, which was completed in
1889. The question of who controlled the water rights to the
Nazas was so important to the economy of the Laguna that the
state of Durango and neighboring Coahuila became embroiled in
a legal battle over the issue which dragged through the Federal
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courts for years until Diaz nationalized the waters of Mexico
in 1888. 25
The states of Durango and Coahuila clashed over water rights
on numerous other occasions. Neither party was pleased by the
increased damming of the Nazas by the Durangueno hacendados,
and a rift within the ruling elite ensued. The principal losers were
the pueblos of the Laguna whose efforts to obtain a just settlement of the water question proved futile. Finally, the struggle of
the pueblos provided the vecinos with a bitter education in the
inefficacy of peaceful protest. Its failure undoubtedly served to
radicalize the orientation of their future efforts.
The creation of a rural proletariat proved crucial during the
Revolution, and was another source of tension within Durangueno society. Although some of the rural working class were
employed in industry and mining, the majority were agricultural
laborers. Wages in the mining industry were the highest in the
state, even though in the Durango mines they were slightly
below the national average. They were generally lower in the
cotton textile industry than in the mines. In other industries they
sank even lower. The lowest wages in the state were paid to agricultural laborers. Low pay was responsible in part for the creation
of a highly mobile work force, for many workers took to the road
in search of better employment. 26 When the time came, a good
many of these displaced peasants joined the rebel armies.
Increased tension between the rural work force and their employers was sparked by three factors: low wages; the dominance
of Americans in the mining industry; and the tienda de raya of
the mining industry. Moreover, in the mines an American machinist received from five to ten pesos per day while his Mexican
counterpart was paid only one to three pesos for equal work,27
The development of an embryonic labor movement had begun
in 1882 with the formation of the Sociedad de Obreros Cat6licos
in Ciudad Durango. Although little is known about this organization, there is some evidence indicating that the union was involved in a strike against the Cerro del Mercado mine in 1884..
Two major strikes in 1907 involved local workers in the strike
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demands of the nation's railroad and textile workers. It is hard
to assess the role of local workers in these strikes, but the fact that
they did participate would suggest that they were cognizant of
the nationwide labor movement. The most important local strike
occurred on April 7, 1909, at the Velardefia mines. A large spontaneous demonstration by the workers to protest low wages and
the influence of Americans in the mines was violently suppressed
by Federal troops at the command of Governor Fernandez. This
nascent union movement could have provided the workers with
invaluable organizational experiences. Probably the repressive
fashion in which the local government dealt with the challenge
served to further politicize the workers. 28
A strong anti-American sentiment among the mine workers was
demonstrably growing during the fading years of the Porfiriato.
As an aftermath of the 1890's silver boom the number of Americans in Durango greatly increased. Clashes were inevitable when
the peasants who were pushed off the land found their way into
the mines. Throughout the 1890'S and the first decade of the
twentieth century, American consular officials in Durango continued to report more anti-Americanism and clashes between
American and Mexican workers within the state. The Velardefia
mines were often singled out by American officials as the strongest source of anti-Americanism. It is little wonder, then, that when
the Revolution erupted, the mines quickly became a frequent
target of the rebel bands.
Curiously, the workers' anti-American sentiment appears to
have been shared by local jefes politicos who resented the favoritism shown to American-owned mines and haciendas by the
State's governors. Time and again, the governors overrode the
decisions of the local authorities. In one notable incident, Governor Fernandez impeached a member of the State supreme court,
who was accused of attacking an American miner. There is also
evidence of anti-American sentiment in the local press. In 1897,
La Evoluci6n bitterly denounced the United States for refusing
to return an American citizen, who was sought in connection
with the murder of a Mexican national, to Durango. It is hardly
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surprising that less than three months after the outbreak of the
Revolution, the U. S. consul reported that between fifty and
seventy-five per cent of Durango's population was anti-American. 29
The continued domination and intransigence of Durango's
inflexible political elite greatly intensified the mounting social
conflict. At the beginning of the Porfiriato, the state was plagued
by political instability. General Juan Manuel Flores was the first
Diaz governor to survive a full term in office, but in 188o Diaz
changed his mind and replaced Flores with a civilian, Francisco
G6mez del Palacio. Within two years, Diaz, apparently disenchanted with Gomez del Palacio's performance, quietly began
urging Flores to attack the efficiency of the G6mez del Palacio
administration. Shortly afterwards Gomez del Palacio died, throwing the state into political confusion. The question of succession
was resolved in 1884 when Diaz once again placed the goyernorship in the hands of Flores. With the assumption of power by
Flores, the full impact of the Porfiriato reached Durango. 30
Flores was reelected four times, making him one of the longest
ruling of the Diaz governors. During his administration, Durango
began to make economic progress, partly as a result of the tranquil
political climate he managed to establish. His death in 1897 produced a temporary resurgence of political instability when Diaz
once more had difficulty in selecting a successor. Between 1897
and 1904 a number of governors came and went. Finally, in 1904,
Diaz decided upon Esteban Fernandez, who remained in power
until mid- 19 11. 31
The principal preoccupation of the Diaz governors was the protection of foreign mining interests, primarily North American,
and those of the commercial haciendas. According to American
consular officials, the governors were quite willing to cooperate
with American interests and in general displayed an extremely hospitable attitude. Furthermore, both Governors Flores and Fernandez were closely linkc:d to mining and commercial agricultural
interests. Besides protecting these economic interest groups, the
governors were constantly promoting the development of transportation facilities, which mainly benefited the state's economic
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elites. 32 One instance of the governor's favoritism toward the haciendas took plac;e in 190 I. In that year, Governor Fernandez
came to the aid of the Hacienda de Sombretillos, near Cuencame,
in its efforts to obtain the land of nearby Indian pueblos. Ignoring
the fact that the pueblos held legal titles to their lands dating back
to the colonial era, Fernandez appointed an arbiter in the case,
who, as one might expect, ruled in favor of the Hacienda de Sombretillos. 33 As the tension in the Laguna mounted during the waning years of the Porhriato, State officials sought to maximize their
control over the rural populace. In 19°5 General Bernardo Reyes
recommended to Governor Fernandez that troops be permanently
stationed in the Laguna in order to reduce the possibility of
an armed uprising, a suggestion which Fernandez prudently
followed. 34
Organized political opposition to the Diaz regime in Durango
centered in Ciudad Durango among the city's professional classes.
A local chapter of the Liberal Party was organized in 19°°. Almost
immediately after the ill-fated Liberal Party Congress of 190 I, the
Durango chapter was suppressed during a nationwide crackdown
on political opposition groups. Yet, it is evident that the Liberal
Party did have some influence in stimulating political consciousness. In his study of the Liberal Party, James Cockcroft lists a
number of Laguna revolutionaries, who, he contends, were affiliated with the Liberal Party, the most prominent being Calixto
Contreras. 35
Another opposition party which protested against the government was the Partido Democratico de Mexico. The party was
supported primarily by middle-income groups, as was the local
chapter of the Anti-reelectionist Party, founded by Pastor Rouaix.
In connection with his 191o presidential campaign, Francisco
Madero made two whistle-stop tours through the state, bringing
with him a spirit of hope for this new generation of anti-Diaz
political activists. In addition to political opposition in Ciudad
Durango, there was much similar activity in T orre6n, which,
because of its proximity to the Laguna, was bound to influence
the region. The fact that the Lerdo-Gomez Palacio-Torreon axis
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witnessed the first onslaught of the Revolution suggests that prerevolutionary political dissent was an important catalyst in educating and radicalizing potential revolutionaries. 36
Perhaps the most common form of opposition in Durango was
the long-standing tradition of banditry. Over the years the state
produced a number of notable bandits, the most nationally famous
being Pancho Villa, who was born on an hacienda in the heart of
the Laguna, and Tomas Urbina, who later became one of Villa's
most trusted generals. The most famous local bandit was Heraclio
Bernal, who operated in the state for more than twelve years until
his death at the hands of the rurales in 1888. The government had
placed a price of ten thousand pesos on his head, a reflection of his
importance. In an editorial about the government campaign against
him, La Bandera Raja commented:
Terror. We know that it is expanding among the inhabitants of the
Sierra as the government troops march against BernaL We have
heard speak of many executions, of many victims of cruelties which
we know cause horror ... We agree that it is necessary to capture
Bernal, but the sentiments of humanity rebel when one considers
the number of innocent victims ...37

Many American miners recalled that the mines were a frequent target for the state's numerous outlaw bands.s8 These diverse
and dissimilar forms of political opposition lead one to surmise
that a fairly long-standing and well-entrenched predisposition to
oppose the government existed, particularly among the lower
classes, and it was readily transformed into revolutionary activity.
The Maderist phase of the Mexican Revolution in Durango
commenced on November 20, 1910, when a small band of rebels
attacked GOmez Palacio. Momentarily successful, the rebels were
soon driven out by Federal troops.
As the fatal days of 1910 drew to a close, Durango's social
system was near collapse. The state was dominated by an intransi~
gent political elite, whose sole purpose seems to have been to serye
Diaz and the state's mining and commercial agricultural interests.
This resulted in the birth of a political opposition movement among
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the workers and the peasants. The economic slump in the mining
industry provoked a downward trend in the Durangueno economy
resulting in rising unemployment and increasing worker discontent. The introduction of commercial agriculture in the Laguna
and the concomitant escalation of land encroachment by the
hacendados seriously weakened the traditional social order, kindling a strong desire for agrarian reform among the peasants. Indeed, land reform became the rallying cry for the Revolution.
Small groups of armed men began to consolidate in the countryside. The strain which modernization had placed upon rapidly
deteriorating social conditions was bound to open up Pandora's
box, and in early February 191 I the Revolution re-erupted simultaneously in several areas of the state.
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may not have been true with regard to the price of silver. He suggests that
it was not until the business depression of 1907 that the price of silver on
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Laguna. It was hardly coincidental that the Mexican Congress, which
passed the law giving the Federal government dominion over the nation's
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LES DOW, SHERIFF OF EDDY COUNTY

PHILIP

J.

RASCH II< LEE MYERS"

IN THE LATE 1800'S, say old-timers who were there, Seven Rivers,
New Mexico, was "as tough as the toughest. Nearly all of the
town's early residents were either outlaws or borderline cases."!
Even if that recollection may have become somewhat exaggerated
with the passing of the years, there is no doubt whatsoever that
the village was filled with desperate characters. And among them
moved no more fearless individual, nor one handier with a gun,
than the sheriff of Eddy County-James Leslie Dow. This is
his story.
Les was born in Clinton, DeWitt County, Texas, on April 30,
1860, the youngest son in a family of seven boys and two girls.
Head of the clan was Samuel Dow, who emigrated there from Mississippi. Although Clinton was then a prosperous village, it has
long since disappeared, leaving only a cemetery to mark its site.
While nothing is known of Les's early years, there is no reason to
believe that they differed in any material way from those of other
youngsters of that period and place. It was almost foreordained
that they would grow up to become cowboys, and, as a young man,
he worked for one of the local cattle kings, Hi Millett.
Les married Mary (Mollie) A. Neatherlin (born in Williamson County, Texas, April 2, 1862) on January 10, 1884, at Pearsall (Frio County), Texas. 2 Shortly thereafter he established a
ranch of his own near Cotulla, Texas, and stocked it with a small
herd of cattle. His first son, Hiram Millett, was born there on April
21, 1885.
-The authors are indebted to Mmes. Max A. Blau, Ethyl M. Paine, James A.
McCollum, and R. T. Bowen for valuable assistance with this paper.
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Early in that year Dow disposed of his ranch and trailed his
cattle to New Mexico. Family tradition has it that he was a
deputy United States marshal at the time and that a livestock
association requested him to move to New Mexico to serve as
their inspector. Dow homesteaded on one hundred sixty acres
on the south side of South Seven Rivers, two miles west of the tiny
town itself. The next several years are unrecorded, but there is
evidence that during that time he not only raised cattle, but ran
a saloon and hotel at Seven Rivers, and played a part in the activities of the local Republican Party.3 Another son, Robert Clinton,
was born at Seven Rivers on July 10, 1888. Two other children
died early in life.
Les's older brother, Cam, owned a cattle ranch near Hope, New
Mexico. 4 He had something of a local reputation as a dangerous
man with a gun, but there seems to be no record of his ever having
killed anyone.
Les apparently began building his own reputation as a gunman
in his saloon on the morning of April 4, 189 I, at the expense of
one Zack Light. Light possessed more courage than sense, a fact
which was helped not a bit by a predilection for the bottle. He was
reputed to be especially dangerous when in his cups, and, as a
consequence, was given a wide berth by all who knew him. Light
was also a Texan and had been involved in several scrapes there,
including the killing of Joe Kyle in the Kinney Saloon at Mason,
Texas, on December 25, 1887. He obtained a change of venue to
Brady and was eventually acquitted. Some time around 1887 or
1888 he drove a herd to Seven Rivers as a member of the ranching
firm of Lytle, Light, and Schriner, of Kerrville, Texas. The original cause of the enmity between Light and Dow is a matter for
speculation. One account has it that Light had never forgiven
Les for testifying against him when he was charged with a murderous assault on William Henderson some time in October
1889.5 Another story is that Light had included a few head of
Dow's cattle in a herd he trailed to Clayton, New Mexico. When
he returned from the sale of these cattle, he failed to make a settlement satisfactory to Les. At any rate, there had been bad blood
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between the two men for some time. They met at Seven Rivers
on April 4, 1891. Light had been drinking and was quarrelsomea fatal error when dealing with a man of Dow's ability with a
revolver.
Dow next attracted publicity in August 1893. A Mexican had
left some money in his hands for safekeeping. A constable named
William H. Smith 6 presented an order for it to be paid to someone
whom Dow did not know. He refused to honor the request, declaring that he would pay the money only to its rightful owner.
An altercation ensued. Each man claimed that the other drew
first, but it was the constable who backed down. 7
The November 1894 contest for sheriff of Eddy County appears to have been more than slightly irregular. The Democratic
Party nominated J. D. Walker; the incumbent sheriff, David L.
Kemp,s supported his deputy and half brother, Walker W. Bush,
from Roby, Texas; the Republican Party nominated Dow. According to Harkey,9 Walker won by a majority of 37 votes over Dow.
The latter brought suit to contest the election. He succeeded in
getting hold of the ballots, and with the assistance of Tom Jones
and Walter Emby, worked a number of them over; erasing Walker's name and substituting his own. Harkey, however, paid Eli
Shavalda fifty dollars to steal the box and then burn it. Consequently Dow's lawyers had nothing to contest and the case was
dropped. The official record shows only that Dow received 346
votes and Walker 381. Bush later paid Harkey the money he had
given Shavalda.
It appears to have been about this time that Dow was appointed
a detective for the Western Texas Cattle Association, whose headquarters were in Fort Worth, Texas, and for the New Mexican
Southeastern Cattle Association. Several of his cases received
fairly widespread publicity. He succeeded in arresting J. c. Beam
in August 1895, when Beam brought an Eddy-Bissel beef into
town hidden under a load of wood. 10 On another occasion the
Swiss farmers residing south of the town complained that a considerable number of their animals had disappeared. After working
on the case for a month or more, Dow found 44 head of cattle
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and 24 horse~ 45 miles northeast of Colorado City, Texas. They
had been shipped there by Ras Cave, who testified that he had
received them from Bush. l1 Dow promptly arrested Bush on a
charge of stealing a cow owned by a man named Corduray. Bush
claimed that he had purchased the animal at the Vic Queen execution sale. Bush also affirmed that all cattle shipped to Colorado
City had been his property, and he invited the public to visit
his pasture at any time to verify his statements.12
However, this did not end Bush's tribulations. Both he and the
fonner sheriff, Kemp, had also been arrested on a charge of stealing a calf from Mrs. A. Y. Smith. The case was dismissed so far
as Kemp was concerned, but Bush was bound over to await the
action of the grand jury.13 In spite of Kemp's exoneration, the
affair must have added fuel to the growing bitterness between
him and Dow.
During the fall of 1895 W. A. Irvin (Irwin?), Frank Garst,
and Andrew McDonald asked Dow to investigate the large-scale
rustling of cattle from their herds. In September he arrested William McNew at Alamo Canyon, near the south end of the Sacramento Mountains. The detective claimed that a gang led by
Oliver M. Lee and McNew had conducted wholesale thefts of
cattle in Lincoln County. He took McNew into custody as he was
driving a herd of beef cattle to El Paso,14 handcuffed him to a
wagon wheel, and ate dinner. After lunch he shot a steer displaying a brand which had been altered to the "pig pen" of Lee and
McNew. Aided by two cowboys, George Bunting and Lee Green,
Dow skinned the steer. He then escorted McNew and the evidence to Lincoln, nearly one hundred miles away.
McNew promptly gave bond and returned home. A few days
later a posse which included Lee and McNew arrested Bunting
and Green on a charge of killing and skinning a steer belonging
to Lee and McNew and took them to Mesilla for a hearing. 15
Early in January 1896 the word spread that Lee, McNew, and
some of Lee's cowboys had come to Eddy for the purpose of killing
Dow. The latter arranged for Irvin and some of his friends to
back him up, and the town nervously awaited a shootout. Lee,
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however, was in a conciliatory mood and a precarious peace between the two men was patched up.
About the middle of the month the grand jury at Lincoln found
indictments against Lee and McNew on charges of larceny of
cattle and defacing brands on a steer belonging to Irvin. 16 The
prosecution was conducted by Colonel Albert Jennings Fountain,
chief investigator and prosecutor for the Southeastern New Mexico
Stock Growers Association. His case is said to have rested largely
on the testimony given by Dow. On the afternoon of January 30
Fountain and his eight-year-old son, Henry, left Lincoln for
their home in Las Cruces. Somewhere beyond the Chalk Hills
they disappeared. Their bodies were never found and their killers
were never identified, although most students of the mystery have
not hesitated to point the finger of suspicion at Lee, McNew, and
James Gililland. l1 Like a number of other famous New Mexican
lawmen, Dow was active in the investigation of the affair, but was
as unsuccessful as his fellows. The rustling indictments against
Lee and McNew were finally dismissed on April 13, 1897.
On July 2 I, 1896, Les took the oath of office as Deputy United
States Marshal. The following month he announced his candidacy for sheriff of Eddy County on the Democratic ticket.
In October of that year George Musgrave murdered Frank
Parker in cold blood in Feliz Canyon, Chaves County, while
Robert Hayes made sure that none of the bystanders interfered.
Both of the murderers were members of the Black Jack Christian
gang known as the High Fives. 1s Deputy Sheriff Charles L. Ballard took up the pursuit. At Deming he wired U. S. Marshal
E. S. Hall to send Dow to his assistance. Later he was to write
that Dow "was one of the bravest and best officers I ever knew. I
was greatly relieved when Les stepped off the train at Deming."19
The two officers decided their quarry must have headed for the
Diamond A horse camp on Deer Creek, Grant County. By dint
of hard riding, Dow, Ballard, Baylor Shannon, Sheriff of Grant
County, and deputies Steve Birchfield and Frank McGlinchy,
reached the ranch before daylight on the eighteenth and secreted
themselves in an old tank partly surrounded by cedar posts. Bob
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Christian and Musgrave appeared, but dismounted and stayed
on a ridge some two to three hundred yards distant. Black Jack
and Hayes rode on down to the camp. Dow called out that they
were officers and ordered the outlaws to throw up their hands.
Instead of obeying, they dropped down behind their horses and
began firing. The officers killed Hayes. Dow shot at Black Jack
five times, but succeeded only in wounding him in the hand and
killing his horse. In spite of this Black Jack escaped and rejoined
his companions. Dow then left the posse to return to Eddy to
qualify as sheriff.
Black Jack was probably killed at Cole Creek, near Clifton,
Arizona, in April of the following year, although identification of
the body was a matter of considerable dispute and the rewards
were never paid. 20 Musgrave escaped to Montana. He was eventually captured, placed on trial in Roswell, and acquitted on June 3,
1910. Unfortunately, Dow himself was not around to witness the
finale. How his demise was brought about has been told in several
versions. What follows is what seems most reasonable to the authors, but they would be the first to admit that it mayor may
not be correct in all details.
On January I, 1897, Dow took office as Sheriff of Eddy County.
Harkey relates that he had a run-in with Dow shortly before he
was elected. A few nights later he saw a man, disguised in a false
beard, carrying a double-barrelled shotgun. Harkey ran him down
and found that it was Dave Kemp. Kemp explained that he had
come back from Arizona to kill Les. Harkey replied that he was
an officer of the law and could not permit a murder in his county,
in reply to which Kemp warned, "Les will kill you."
About 6:45 P. M. on Thursday, February 18, Dow strolled out
of the post office, reading a letter. As he passed the office of the
Eddy Argus, near the corner of Canyon and Fox Streets, Kemp
and William Kennon stepped out of the doorway. Kemp fired a
pistol literally in Dow's face. The bullet entered the left side of
the mouth and shattered the jawbone, just missing the jugular
vein, and came out at the left side of the neck behind and under
the left ear. The weapon was held so close that Dow's face was
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powder burned and the Rash blinded him. He never knew who
shot him.
The wounded man was carried into Blackmore's Drug Store
and given emergency treatment. He was then taken to his home
and operated upon by Drs. Walsmuth and Whicher while lying
on a table in his front room. At the time it was not thought that
the wound would prove fatal, but the sheriff died about eight
0' clock the following morning without having regained conSCIOusness.
A coroner's inquest found that the deceased died from a gunshot wound at the hands of parties unknown. The governor immediately offered a five-hundred-dollar reward for the arrest and
conviction of each of the murderers. A public meeting in Eddy expressed "indignation and abhorance of this dastardly crime" and
urged that every effort be made to bring the perpetrators to justice,
commended the governor for his action, and extended heartiest
sympathy to the bereaved wife and children. Within a few minutes a public subscription collected $ 1 ,908 to be offered as a purse
for the conviction of the murderer; eventually an amount in excess
of $2500 was posted. 21 Rumors were rife that Lee had ordered
Dow's execution. Nothing was ever proved in this respect and
it would appear that the murdered man's sons gave it no credence.
Kemp and Kennon were placed under arrest the next day and
indicted by the grand jury on October 14, 1897. The prosecution
moved for a change of venue on the grounds that it would be
impossible to obtain a jury in Eddy County. After considerable
wrangling, both parties agreed that the case should be transferred
to Chaves County. The case came to trial in Roswell late in
March 1898.
Plans of the defense to claim that Kemp was not in the county
when the crime was committed were quickly torpedoed. C. W.
Moore, a compositor in the office of the Eddy Argus, testified to
seeing two men sitting in a recess at the front of the building and
a third standing across the street. After hearing a shot he turned
and saw two men running away. A. H. Asbury swore that he
positively recognized the two runners as Kemp and Kennon. His

248

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLIX:3 1974

testimony was supported by that of A. N. Elliott and one or two
others.
The attorneys for the accused then adopted a theory of "selfdefense." William H. Smith, identified as the third man on the
scene, Kennon, and Kemp took the stand in turn. Their story was
that Dow had recognized Kemp, called him a damn sonofabitch,
and reached for his pistol, whereupon Kemp beat him to the
draw. Smith's testimony should be evaluated in the light of
Harkey's statement that at the time of the shooting Smith was
at work in a sugar beet factory. Later, Harkey said, he learned
that Kemp had paid Smith fifty dollars for his testimony and
instructed him to leave the country, which he did. 22 According
to Mrs. Dow, Fred Butler, a photographer, testified that he had
gone out in front of his establishment to get some fresh air. A
man giving his name as Boyd came up and asked him to go back
into his studio to discuss some business. Once inside Boyd seemed
to be at a loss for words. In view of Harkey's statement he may
actually have been the third man, but he was not called upon
to testify.
To one reading the newspaper accounts of the trial it comes
as a shock to learn that the jury brought in a verdict of "not guilty."
Dow's friends made no secret of their belief that it was the result
of perjured testimony.23 Harkey is probably correct in commenting that "Les's reputation helped Dave in his defense."24 After
Dow's death the Santa Fe Daily New Mexican had commented
that "He was involved in several fatal quarrels before leaving
Texas and had earned the reputation of a gun fighter, which he
seemed to enjoy."25 The writers have found no record of any
such "fatal quarrels" in Texas and believe that this report is false.
It is, however, of importance in showing the view of Dow held
by his contemporaries.
To the historian the published accounts of the testimony are
highly frustrating in that nowhere do they establish a motivation
for this cold-blooded murder. Neither has anyone writing since
the trial come forward with a reasonable theory.

Les Dow
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The town of Eddy received another surprise in June, when
Mrs. Dow unexpectedly married Frank Rheinboldt, of McMillan
(now Lakewood), fifteen miles north of Seven Rivers. Rheinboldt was a member of the board of county commissioners. He
was from a Cincinnati family, who strongly opposed the marriage.
It seems to have been ill fated from the beginning and finally
ended in divorce.· Mary resumed the name of Dow and moved to
Miami, Arizona, where she ran the Executive Officers Boarding
House for the Inspiration Copper Company for six years. She
returned to Carlsbad for a time, but in 1943 moved to Phoenix,
Arizona, where she died on March 26, 1949, aged 87 years. Both
of her sons attended Washington & Lee University, became lawyers, and played prominent roles in the political life of the state
of New Mexico-Hiram as Lieutenant Governor and Robert as
Attorney General. Hiram died at Roswell on March 7, 1969;
Robert passed away at Carlsbad on December 14, 1969.
Kemp's popularity in Eddy County pretty
well waned. In addition to his unsavory role in the Dow murder
he had been involved in another discreditable affair. Willie Bush,
son of Walker W., had been arrested on a charge of stealing cattle.
In the District Court on October 23, 1897, Bush and Warren
Hogan were sentenced to a year in the penitentiary. Kemp was
fined twenty-five dollars and sentenced to two months in fail for
contempt of court for trying to influence the testimony of a witness, Bruce Jones. 26 Kemp ranched for a time on the west bank
of the Pecos River, a short distance east of Loving. According to
Harkel'l during this time he was suspected of rustling sixteen
cows from R. S. Benson. However, Doc Lignon, alias Charley
Watson, accepted full responsibility for the theft.
Later Kemp relocated at Cedar Lake. He moved to Lipscomb
County, Texas, in 1900 and became a highly respected citizen
there. He was involved in the real estate business with J. C. Jensen at Higgins from 1905 to 1908. When the partnership was
dissolved he used his share of the proceeds to found a town called
Kemp City just across the border in Oklahoma. Because there
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was already an established Kemp City in the state, its name was
changed to La Kemp. When the railroad by-passed it, the town
was moved to the rails and became Booker, T exas.28
Kemp served asa special deputy sheriff in Lipscomb County
for several years. Unfortunately he suffered two tragedies. About
1928 the body of his brother, Yancey Kemp, was found near his
ranch in the Pine Lodge area, west of Roswell. He had been shot
to death. His murderer was never identified. One of Kemp's
brothers-in-law, Denton Robertson, operated a goat ranch at
McKittrick Spring, about four or five miles west of Carlsbad.
His body was found in the ashes of his ranch house, but the
authors have been unable to date the event.
Kemp himself died of a heart attack on January 4, 1935, while
watering his cattle. In one of his more egregious errors Harkey
reports that Dave was shot by his sister. 29 This statement has
been picked up and repeated by later writers, but there is no
truth in it.sO Certainly Kemp's story is discreditable enough,
without further blackening the record with a complete calumny.
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NOTES
1. James Edward and George Louis Howell to Myers, personal communication, Dec. I I, 1970.
2. Eddy Current, Feb. 20, 1897.
3. Dee Harkey, Mean as Hell (Albuquerque, 1948), pp. 58-60.
4· Alexander Campbell Dow was born in Pearsall, Texas, ca. 1857.
He was found dead in his home near Lakewood on Nov. I, 1932. The date
of death was thought to have been about ten days earlier. He was buried
in an unmarked grave in the family plot at Carlsbad, N. M.
5. Las Vegas Free Press, April 18, 1891.
6. Smith was elected constable of Eddy Precinct, Eddy County, on
Jan. 12, 1891, and reelected on Jan. 9, 1893. He was defeated for a third
term by Dee Harkey in the election of Jan. 14, 1895. His real name is
said to have been William Rogers.
7. Eddy Argus, Aug. I I ,1893.
8. Kemp was born March I, 1861. Both Mason County and Bosque
County, Texas, have been mentioned as the site. However, he was raised
in Hamilton County. He is reputed to have killed one "Doll" Smith, who
was fighting with Kemp's friend Dan Bogan. He was tried in Gatesville
apd sentenced to be hanged. One account has it that when the penalty
was announced Kemp made a desperate effort to escape by jumping out
of a second story window. He broke both ankles and was quickly recaptured. Because of his youth the Governor commuted the sentence to
life imprisonment, and later pardoned him. Apparently he then went to
New Mexico. He first appears in the Eddy Argus early in 1890, when he
is mentioned as the partner of one· Gray in ownership of the Wolf
Saloon. Later he acquired full ownership of the business. He was ~lected
first sheriff of the newly organized Eddy County on Nov. 4, 1890, and
reelected in 1892. After selling the Wolf he entered into a partnership
with Ed Lyell in the saloon, gambling, and cattle business. On Sept. 15,
1894, Kemp performed Eddy County's only legal execution, when he
hanged James Barrett for murder.
9. Harkey, pp. 58-60.
10. Eddy Current, Aug. 8, 1895.
I 1. Ibid" Oct. 3, 1895.
12. Ibid., Nov. 7, 1895.
13. Roswell Register, Oct. 3°,1895.
14. Eddy Current, Oct. 1'7, 1895..
15. Rio Grande Republican, Nov. 15, 1895.
16. Causes Nos. 1489 and 1490, Lincoln County.
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17. Eugene Cunningham wrote to. one of the authors (PJR) that
he had been told that he had once stood on the site of Fountain's grave.
He believed that it must have been in an old corral at Pellman's Well.
18. For a firsthand account of this killing see Amanda Treat, "Eye
Witness to Murder," Lincoln County News, March 26, 1970.
19. Brownie Emerson, "Charles Ballard's Colorful Career Included
Being Blown Out Window," Roswell Daily Record, Dec. 26,1955.
20. Jeff Burton, Black Jack Christian: Outlaw (Santa Fe, 1967), p. 29.
21. Harkey, pp. 120-24; Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, Feb. 19, 23,
1897; Eddy Current, Feb. 20, Mar. 8,1897.
22. Harkey, p. 124.
23. Cecil Bonney, Looking Over My Shoulder (Roswell, 1971), p. 105.
24· Harkey, p. 124.
25. Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, Feb. 19, 1897.
26. Eddy Current, Oct. 23,1897.
27. Harkey, pp. 126-28.
28. Mrs. Lowell Bowdle and Mrs. Mason Lemons, eds., Dimensions
of Progress Booker (n.p., n.d.), p. 23.
29. Harkey, p. 128.
30. Mrs. Max A. Blau to Rasch, Dec. 20, 1970; Mrs. Ethyl M. Paine
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Booker, pp. 166-67.

253

Bool~ Reviews
McDERMOIT, ed., The Spanish in the Mississippi
Valley, 1762-1804, by Caughey

254

HILL, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's
Executive Agents in Mexico, by Meyex

255

MEYER, Huerta, A Political Portrait, by Secrest
CLEAVELAND with FITZPATRICK, The Morleys-Young
Upstarts on the Southwest Frontier, by Murphy
GOPF, George W. P. Hunt and His Arizona, by Lyon
FAULK, Destiny Road: The Gila Trail and
the Opening of the Southwest, by Ellis
OPLER, ed., Grenville Goodwin Among the
Western Apache: Letters from the
Field, by Schroeder
MARQUIS, comp., and LIMBAUGH, ed., Cheyenne and Sioux,
The Reminiscences of Four Indians and
a White Soldier, by Ellis
GLASER, Indians or Jews? An Introduction by Lynn Glaser to a
Reprint of Manasseh Ben Israel's The Hope of
Israel, by Greenleaf

260

254

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLIX:3 1974

THE SPANISH IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, 1762-1804. Edited by John
Francis McDermott. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974. Pp.
xiii, 421. Illus., index. $15.00.
FOR ALMOST two hundred years New Mexico was a lonesome Spanish
salient thrust far to the north. Then in the 1760's Spain took over the
western two-thirds of French Louisiana and on the west coast sent a small
task force to open a new frontier in California. Now on the map it appeared that New Mexico had two sister provinces, though in fact contacts
with them were minimal.
Excursionists from the upper Rio Grande Valley to California in the
1770'S or 1780's might have felt they were seeing their "contemporary
ancestors" pioneering on that new frontier. The same excursionists to
Missouri or New Orleans would have found a substantially different
life style, economy, Indian policy, and function in the empire. The differences are ascribable to the legacy of people and practices from the
French regime and to the defensive role against the British and then
against the much more aggressive American nation and frontiersmen.
This volume, edited by John Francis McDermott, was generated by a
conference on Spanish Louisiana. It opens with an introductory overview and three essays deSCribing the resources in print and in the Louisiana and Mexican archives. Then follow a dozen papers on freely chosen
and scattered topics, four or five of them substantially expanded beyond
the versions read. Inevitably the book is a miscellany rather than a comprehensive history of Spanish Louisiana. Elements slighted include the
war years, Indian relations eastward, and American penetration.
John Preston Moore writes on the gentility of Anglo-Spanish rivalry
on the Florida-Louisiana border in the 1760's and Robert L. Gold on
Spanish espionage in Pensacola in 1777. McDermott comes to the rescue
of Fernando de Leyba, whom historians have handled roughly for his
r6le in the defense of St. Louis in 1780. C. Richard Arena describes land
setdement policies, which William S. Coker further elaborates in connection with the work of the Bryan Bruins, father and son, in 1787-1788.
Insulated as it was from imperial rivals, New Mexico, at least at the
time, had no such experiences.
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Carl H. Chapman's 'The Indomitable Osage" and John C. Ewer's
"Symbols of Chiefly Authority" illuminate adaptations from French
Indian policy, some of which came into use in New Mexican dealings
with the Plains Indians. A. P. Nasatir's paper on Pedro Vial should be of
interest at both ends of the Santa Fe Trail. Writing on Philip Nolan's
entry into Texas in 1800, Noel M. Loomis chronicles Spanish concern
not unlike that when Zebulon Montgomery Pike made his unauthorized
entry into New Mexico.
John G. Clark's ''The Cabildo in the Economic Development of New
Orleans," Jack D. L. Holmes' "Regulation of Taverns and the Liquor
Trade," and Samuel Wilson, Jr.'s "Almonester: Philanthropist and
Builder," provide graphic detail on the economic and social history of the
provincial capital and its vicinity.
University

of

California at Los Angeles

JOHN CAUGHEY

EMISSARIES TO A REVOLUTION: WOODROW WILSONS ExECUTIVE AGENTS
IN MEXICO. By Larry D. Hill. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 394. Illus., bibliog., index. $12.95.
WOODROW WILSON'S policy toward Mexico scarcely constitutes a virgin
field for historical research. Arthur Link, Robert Quirk, Kenneth J. Grieb,
William Teitelbaum, Peter Calvert, and Berta Ulloa have all written
books developing the various aspects of the American President's Mexican
policy. The periodical literature on the topic is also rich. But in spite of
the respectable corpus of published literature, Larry Hill has written a
valuable and original work which chronicles the activities of Wilson's
series of special agents in Revolutionary Mexico.
In one sense the study is corrective as the author challenges the assumptions previously posited by other Mexican and Unite9 States diph
matic historians. Hill indicates, for example, that Grieb (The United
States and Huerta) was in error when he argued that William Bayard
Hale spoke only to enemies of Huerta and that he made policy recommendations prior to conducting his investigation. He also takes issue with
Grieb on the preparedness of Californian Reginald del Valle to conduct
a special mission for the President. While Grieb contends that del Valle
was thoroughly familiar with Mexican politics, Hill argues that although
the special agent at least spoke Spanish, he was not conversant with the
nature of the Revolutionary struggle.
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The major contribution of Emissaries to a Revolution is not, however,
its occasional revisionism but rather the careful narrative exposition of
the work of the special agents themselves and the impact of their reports
on the formulation of the so often misguided State Department and
White House policy. In addition to tracing the activities of the wellknown emissaries such as Hale, del Valle, John Lind, and George
Carothers, Hill also brings to light the fact-finding missions and diplomatic
initiatives of some of the lesser-known agents such as Duval West, John
R. Silliman, Leon Canova, and John W. Belt.
The research for this study is impressive. In addition to extensive use
of the Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs
of Mexico, the author has worked the Bryan, Lansing, Pershing, Lind,
and Fall Papers and, unlike many United States diplomatic historians
with Mexican interests, was patient enough to gain access to Mexico's
Archivo General de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. The major
published documents and secondary works have been consulted as well.
The narrative is well written and tightly constructed and should find a
favorable audience among both United States and Mexican historians.
Emissaries to a Revolution is diplomatic history as it should be written.
University of Arizona

MICHAEL C. MEYER

HUERTA, A POLITICAL PORTRAIT. By Michael C. Meyer. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972. Pp. xvi, 272. Maps, app., bibliog.,
index. $9.50'
BIOGRAPHIES are often written either to vilify or to glorify an individual.
The interest which an author has in his subject, and certainly the time
and care needed to write a good biography, entail a certain fascination
with either the man and his quest-or his infamy. With Huerta, the intention is to better understand a man who has perhaps been overvilified.
In his treatment of Victoriano Huerta, Professor Meyer has produced
a very readable account of one of the more unsavory characters in Mexican history, a man cursed and reviled by generations of his countrymen as
a usurper and as the murderer of Francisco Madero. As president, (February 1913 to July 1914) Huerta lasted less than eighteen months, yet he
occupies a unique, and certainly unenviable, spot in Mexican history.
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The popular niche which Huerta fills would have to be compared with
that of Caligula, Robespierre, or some other such personality whose brutal
career reeked of treachery, cynicism, and a callous disregard for the welfare of his countrymen.
It was this popular attitude which partially prompted the book, a
study which seeks to explore the man in more depth than had been undertaken in a brief but thought-provoking study published in 1960 by Richard
E. Greenleaf and William L. Sherman. Meyer's book focuses on Huerta's
politics and methods and this it does very well. Perhaps the most revealing chapter is the one on "The Man and the Dictatorship," though the
emphasis is far more on the dictatorship than on the man himself, and
this is one of the few criticisms which might be made. The author, as
he clearly states, had no personal papers with which to work, but there
is a dearth of analysis on the dictator himself. Even without any personal
papers, a better portrait of the man might have been attempted, using
contemporary sources. History, first of all, is people, and no man considers himself a villain. One thirsts for a better understanding of this
very complex being. Was he indeed an amoral Borgia with a brain
pickled by alcohol, or was he a hardfisted, rational schemer who really
felt that his methods and leadership could best serve a nation which stood
at a crossroads?
In his attempt to explain Huerta's political record the author has
avoided any real criticism of either Madero or his administration. Perhaps
this is to avoid a biography of Huerta at the expense of Madero, but
the book fails to convey the atmosphere, the uncertainties and the rising
tide of criticism against the Madero regime. Madero tried hard to be a
spiritual and moral saint, but, politically, many of his notions and attributes were hardly an asset, above all in post-Dfaz Mexico. And contrasting the two regimes, Meyer stresses that Huerta's government proposed
more advanced and farsighted reforms than did that of Madero. But it
is most likely, as the author acknowledges, that it was the prevailing current of reform which carried the regime into social legislation. It was
a current which had been activated, verbally at least, during the latter
years of the Dfaz era. How else can one account for President Porfirio
Dlaz' detested vice-president, Ram6n Corral, addressing a Mexico City
Indigenista congress on the necessity of improving the lot of the poor,
downtrodden Indian? Or the aging Dfaz himself voicing elaborate plans
for buying hacienda lands and selling parcels to the landless during the
last months of the Porfiriato? These two stalwarts of the old order had
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become increasingly aware of the strong undercurrent which demanded
change and which gathered strength despite changing regimes and sometimes chaotic conditions.
Perhaps the book will induce some Americans to look at Huerta and
his record with a more charitable attitude, but it is doubtful that Mexicans
will ever see the man and his government as anything but a national
tragedy. Victoriano Huerta must bear the responsibility for presiding
over the murder of a political messiah. Madero's tragic death insured
his martyrdom, enshrined his ideals, at least in rhetoric, and perhaps
permanently blackened the reputation of the man who succeeded him
in power.

Fresno, California

JAMES SECREST

THE MORLEYS-YOUNG UPSTARTS ON

THE SOUTHWEST FRONTIER. By
Norman Cleaveland with George Fitzpatrick. Albuquerque: Calvin
Horn Publisher, Inc., 1971. Pp. xii, 270. Illus., bibliog., index. $7.50'

FEW TOPICS in New Mexico history have received the attention devoted to
land grant controversies in Colfax County during the 1870's and 1880'S.
Historians, both scholarly and popular, have produced a vast array of
articles and books. Yet, as Norman Cleaveland demonstrates in his recent
volume, controversies, inconsistencies, gaps in our knowledge of what
occurred, and uncertainties of interpretation persist. Indeed, with each new
book, they seem to.grow.
Cleaveland's book, written with the assistance of long-time New Mexico
Magazine editor George Fitzpatrick, focuses on his grandparents, William
R. and Ada McPherson Morley. It also includes an autobiographical
reminiscence describing ranch life near Magdalena at the turn of the century and a chapter on "Uncle Ray." In many ways the book updates and
elaborates on material included in Agnes Morley Cleaveland's Satan's
Paradise and No Life for a Lady. She was Norman Cleaveland's mother,
and both volumes are quoted at length.
Morley's stay in New Mexico was brief, his importance fairly limited. He
arrived in Cimarron in 1871 as an engineer and surveyor for the English
Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company. His youthful vigor and
professional capacity apparently impressed the company's officials, for he
eventually came to manage its local operations. Five years later, "tiring of
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inactivity," Morley resigned. As an engineer for the Denver and Rio
Grande Western, he participated in the dramatic battle for control of the
Royal Gorge, then moved south to engineer a railway line in the Mexican
state of Sonora. January 3, 1883, he died of an accidental gunshot wound
near Santa Rosalia, southeast of Chihuahua City.
The bulk of this book concentrates on the five-year period during which
Morley worked in Cimarron. As Cleaveland portrays it, this was an era
dominated by conspiracy, deceit, and violence. As an editor of the Cimarron
News, later the News and Press, Morley had his life threatened and his
printing office destroyed. The highest political officials in the Territory
plotted against him, his wife, even his mother-in-law. Clay Allison,
described as a "jovial, hard-riding, hard-drinking, gun-toting cowman,"
played an important although somewhat confused role in these events.
Governor S. B. Axtell, Stephen B. Elkins, Thomas B. Catron, O. P. McMains, Frank Springer, and other well-known New Mexicans took part
either as villains or heroes.
Cleaveland's own judgments about the land grant controversy seem to
be mixed. On the one hand, he sympathizes with the farmers and miners
expelled from their homes or forced to pay rent for property they considered
their own. The "native New Mexicans," he explains, had been "as completely enslaved as the thralls of ancient Norsemen." On the other hand, as
an employee of the English company, Morley "with the enthusiasm and
optimism of youth, sought to ... collect from the squatters and miners
or eject them." Instead of blaming Colfax County combatants for the
injustices which occurred, Cleaveland argues that. the real enemy was
the Santa Fe Ring. He accepts without question Ralph Emerson Twitchell's
conclusion that "this group found themselves the leaders in all public
affairs, and were, indeed, in control of thought and sentiment throughout
the entire territory." It is unfortunate that Cleaveland failed to use more
recent studies or examine the Ring, its leaders, or its activities. He merely
assumes that it existed and blames it for every malevolent action, thus
exonerating his grandfather and other land grant employees. Such an
explanation, while refreshingly simple, fails to explain the complexities of
New Mexico politics and· the exceedingly complicated land grant controversy.
In other respects, too, readers may be disappointed in this book. The
author relies heavily on secondary sources, quoting works by Jim Berry
Pearson and William Keleher, as well as Agnes Morley Cleaveland, at
great length. Obscure references in quotations are seldom explained. An
astonishingly large number of quotes include no citation, so the reader
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cannot know the source of the material. The few Morley letters are sadly
uninformative, .concentrating on the weather or the scenery more than
anything else. The bibliography lists a number of important manuscript
collections, including the Maxwell Land Grant Company papers, but none
seem to have been used. The book also depends on family tradition. References such as "Granny often told us" or "according to family tradition"
occur regularly.
As usual Calvin Hom has produced a handsome book, including an
excellent end-paper map, a selection of photographs, and a name index.
The definitive history of the Colfax County War has yet to be written, but
future historians dealing with this subject will undoubtedly give appropriate attention to the activities of William R. Morley. Their task will be somewhat facilitated by Norman Cleaveland's affectionate study of his grandparents.

Western Illinois University

LAWRENCE R. MuRPHY

GEORGE W. P. HUNT AND HIS ARIZONA. By John S. Goff. Pasadena, Calif.:
Socio Technical Publications, 1973. Pp. viii, 286. lIlus., bibliog., index.
$10.00.
FOR THOSE who know the present political climate of Arizona, it is difficult
to believe that the state once possessed a politician as radical as George
W. P. Hunt, and a successful one at that. Hunt was elected to the
governor's office more often than any other candidate in the United States,
and served longer than any other statesman except Orval Faubus of
Arkansas. There has long been a need for a biography of Hunt. Little has
been done on twentieth-eentury Arizona, and certainly Hunt is a major
historical character in this century. Hunt has left a considerable body of
resource materials in various Arizona depositories, so he has been accessible
to historians, who, however, have tended to neglect him.
The author, John Goff, is the first to publish a biography of Hunt, after
a long and continuing interest in him dating from 1961 when he began
organizing materials on his life. Immediately the question is raised, what
does Goff make of Hunt? It is a perennial question, much discussed by the
commentators on Hunt's career. Was he really radical, or conservative? Did
he sell out to his enemies in the 1920'S? Was he pro-labor and anticorporation? Was he for democracy or for G. W. P. Hunt?
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The question of Hunt's consistency or opportunism is the more interesting because of his appearance: his handlebar mustache, bald pate, white
suits, and his size! On Arizona's fiftieth anniversary of statehood, someone,
also with girth, and a false handlebar, dressed up like Hunt and re-enacted
the whole inaugural ceremony from the walk down the boulevard to his
repetition of the inaugural address. Not many state politicians are re-created
for us these days.
What was Hunt really like? He was really a combination JeffersonianJacksonian. He believed fervently in states rights (from which vantage he
stubbornly attacked the Boulder Canyon project) and in the people (which
led him to turn the highway department into a spoils system). If you were
not oile hundred per cent for Hunt, then you did not deserve a state job.
Hunt's problem was that he was so humanitarian, especially in the area of
prison reform and abolition of the death penalty, that he was far ahead of
the people. He never got along with the legislature, and his only excuse
for the abuse of the patronage was to wait for the people to catch up with
him. They never did, and probably never have.
Goff's book is narrative, except for a chapter on the Colorado River fight.
It concentrates myopically on the Hunt sources, and lacks perspective and
at times explanation of cryptic facts. Its prose is often inelegant. While this
biography is certainly not magisterial, it does bring us new information and
will help us to clarify the true significance of Hunt. About such a controversial figure, Goff has maintained a proper balance. Hunt did have his
foibles, but Goff makes him believable, and the reader becomes sympathetic
if not a partisan.
.
.
Northern Arizona University

WILLIAM

H.

LYON

DESTINY ROAD: THE GILA TRAIL AND THE OPENING OF THE SOUTHWEST.

By Odie B. Faulk. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. ix,
232. Illus., notes, bibliog., index. $7.50'
the nineteenth century the Gila Trail from Texas to California
was an important route that linked the Golden State to the rest of the
nation. Units of the American army under Philip St. George Cooke pioneered the road while en route to California in 1846. It was a route for
cattle drives to the gold fields in the 1850's and became famous during that
decade as a portion of the Butterfield Overland Trail which provided mail
DURING
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service and stagecoach travel between the Mississippi Valley and the
Pacific coast. During the Civil War troops from California marching to
the relief of New Mexico used the road which subsequently became the
route for the Southern Pacific Railroad and ultimately an Interstate highway.
With some background on Indian and Spanish activity in the area, Odie
Faulk narrates the story of the Gila Trail between the march of Cooke's
Mormon Battalion in 1846 to the arrival of the railroad in the 1870'S and
1880'S. It is a somewhat loose and episodical account that is based largely
upon published material.· At least the manuscript sources listed do not
appear to have been utilized to any great extent. Odie Faulk, who has
written, co-authored or edited more than a book a year for the past five
years, has written a general account of the trail in his typically readable
style, but unfortunately he adds little to the history of the Southwest. This
is an overview rather than a thorough and analytical history of the trail.
Those familiar with the history of the region will find little that is new.
University of New Mexico

RICHARD N. ELLIS

GRENVILLE GOODWIN AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE: LETI'BRS FROM
THE FIELD. Edited by Morris E. Opler. Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1973. Pp. 103. Illus., bibliog., index. $4.50'
THIS is a nice tribute to Grenville Goodwin in which the editor reproduces Goodwin's letters to him during the 1930'S while working among
the Apaches. Though Opler does not include his replies to Goodwin's
letters, which would have made this volume more interesting, footnotes
help to explain what led to certain exchanges on a variety of subjects.
Goodwin's published work on The Social Organization of the Western
Apache (1942) contains considerable detail resulting from his study, including practically everything mentioned in his letters. However, the
correspondence reproduced by Opler helps to portray the status of Southwestern ethnological research in the early 1930'S, as well as some of the
thinking that eventually was incorporated into Goodwin's posthumous
publication.
National Park Service
Santa Fe, New Mexico

ALBERT H. SCHROEDER
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CHEYENNE AND SIOUX. THE REMINISCENCES OF FOUR INDIANS AND A
WHITE SOLDIER. Compiled by Thomas B. Marquis. Edited by Ronald
H. Limbaugh. Stockton, California: Pacific Center for Western Historical Studies, 1973. Pp. iv, 79. Illus., bibliog., index. $5.50'
IN THE 1920's Thomas B. Marquis, newspaperman, doctor, and lawyer,
was a government physician at the Northern Cheyenne Reservation in
Montana. Intensely interested in the Plains Indians, he began to record
autobiographical accounts of elderly Indian friends, publishing several
in Century Magazine and one major account in Wooden Leg, A Warrior
Who Fought Custer, a book that has been widely read by historians. The
six narratives presented here, three by Cheyennes, one by a white soldier
with the Cheyenne scouts, and one by an Oglala Sioux, were preserved by
Marquis' daughters and recently made available for publication. Two of
the selections were published in condensed form by Marquis in Century
Magazine.
These narratives provide useful information on a wide variety of topics
ranging from Cheyenne culture to the Bight of Dull Knife's band from
Indian Territory in 1879, service in the Cheyenne Scouts, the battle.at
Wounded Knee, and the death of Sitting Bull. Other subjects include
conBicts with other tribes, reservation life, and reaction's to white pressure
for acculturation.
The value of these niurativesis obvious at first glance because Marquis
was an excellent practitioner of oral history and his informants, especially Iron Teeth, a ninety-five-year-old Northern Cheyenne woman, were
competent, but they are especially valuable because of the dearth of such
firsthand material. As with all source material, these accounts mu~t be
used with care and tested against other information. Because of their
reliance on oral traditions Indian people have given us ,remarkably accurate accounts of their history, but memories do get cloudy and the
sequence of events often becomes confused. Therefore it is unfortunate
that the editor has not tested the reliability of these narratives and provided more elaborate annotation.
Interested readers might find it useful to compare these accounts with
those collected by George, Bent in Life of George Bent Written From
His Letters or even Apache narratives that Grenville Goodwin collected
in the Southwest at apprOximately the same time that Marquis was with
the' Northern Cheyennes, which were recently published in Western
Apache Raiding and Warfare.

University

of New

Mexico

RICHARD N. ELLIS
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INDIANS OR JEWS? AN INTRODUCTION BY LYNN GLASER TO A REPRINT OF
MANASSEH BEN ISRAEL'S THE HOPE OF ISRAEL. Gilroy, Calif.: Roy V.
Boswell, Publisher, 1973. Pp. xii, 74,PP. iv, 86. Illus., notes. $17·50'
THIS HANDSOME volume is one of a large number of works which seek to
trace the notion that the American Indians were descended from the
ten lost tribes of Israel. The book is divided into two parts: a.n essay by
Lynn Glaser tracing the origins of the legend and recounting some of the
bizarre ideas and· "evidence" of its veracity from the sixteenth century
to the 1800'S. Part Two is a reprint of a famous seventeenth-century
treatise on the subject. The essay includes a survey treatment of "American Eschatology and the Mormons" which delineates some of Joseph
Smith's ideas on the "Indian Jews." While Glaser's essay, some seventyfour pages, is generally interesting and informative it provides no new
information to the scholar. Nor does it reflect scholarly acquaintance with
the profeSSional bibliography. A summary of Professor Seymour B. Liebman's WIitings on the "Indian Jews" or "Mestizo Jews" in Mexico might
have enhanced the volume and if Glaser had been aware of Liebman's
many writings, he might have been able to bring more professional bibliography to his task.
The main attraction of Indians or Jews? is Part Two, a reprint of
The Hope of Israel. Written by Manasseh Ben Israel, a Hebrew Divine
and Philosopher, an English translation published in London in 1652.
Manasseh presents a seventeenth-century version of the legend that the
American Indian was descended from the lost ten tribes. Ben Israel,
rabbi and author, was probably born in Lisbon in 1604 and he died in
Middleburg, Holland, in 1657. Though he was a learned man, his WIitings show that he embraced many of the superstitions of the age. Manasseh established the first Hebrew print shop in Amsterdam and corresponded widely with Jewish and non-Jewish scholars of the time before
he WIote The Hope of Israel in 1650'
This is an attractive volume that might be of interest to buffs and to
devotees of "odd ball" theories of history. The scholar will be more interested in studying the mentality of Manasseh Ben Israel.
Tulane University

RICHARD E. GREENLEAF
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